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THE INDIGENOUS MCCLAIN DOCTRINE: 
A NEW LEGAL TOOL TO PROTECT CULTURAL 
PATRIMONY AND THE RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION 
MATTHEW H. BIRKHOLD* 
ABSTRACT 
In December 2010, the United States endorsed the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which 
obligates the United States to respect indigenous self-determination and 
protect Native American cultural objects. Yet, nearly a decade later, the 
United States has made little progress to meet these commitments, 
resulting in growing frustration in the indigenous and international human 
rights communities. At its 2017 meeting on the implementation of 
UNDRIP, the U.N. expert group condemned the United States for its 
inaction. But the failure to act is not the result of indifference. Current 
U.S. law makes it impossible for the United States to satisfy its human 
rights obligations.  
This Article identifies a paradoxical conflict resulting from the dual 
obligation imposed by UNDRIP: the current statutory scheme for 
protecting indigenous cultural property in America (NAGPRA) actually 
undermines tribal self-determination. By carefully analyzing NAGPRA 
case law, this article shows that non-indigenous judges, lawyers, and 
defendants identify what constitutes Native Americans’ cultural property. 
Tribal law represents the ideal legal scheme for respecting self-
determination, but tribal criminal law cannot be extended over non-
Indians, making it an ineffectual safeguard of cultural heritage. The 
seeming irreconcilability of these two goals amounts to the “indigenous 
cultural patrimony problem.” Can a law effectively protect Native 
American cultural patrimony while simultaneously respecting the right of 
indigenous peoples to exercise cultural self-determination?  
This article offers an innovative solution by applying art law 
jurisprudence to Federal Indian law. Specifically, this article argues that 
the paradox can be resolved by utilizing the legal instrument deployed to 
address stolen foreign cultural property (the McClain doctrine) in the 
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domestic context. This Article proposes a new legal tool: the “indigenous 
McClain doctrine,” which effectively extends criminal tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians in cases involving stolen Native American cultural 
property, thereby resolving the conflict and meeting America’s obligations 
under UNDRIP. Importantly, this article demonstrates that the 
“indigenous McClain doctrine” faces no jurisprudential bar—despite the 
prohibition of extending tribal criminal law to non-Indians—and it makes 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States is not fulfilling its obligations under the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).1 In 
particular, since endorsing the groundbreaking human rights Declaration 
in 2010, the United States has failed to adequately protect Native 
American cultural objects and respect Native Americans’ right to self-
determination. These shortcomings have recently been the subject of 
frustrated discussion at the United Nations. The U.N. expert group, 
convened in January 2017 to assess the implementation of UNDRIP, 
 
1. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 
13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP]. 











described the United States’ “reluctan[ce] to make a high-level 
commitment to indigenous rights instruments.”2 The United States’ 
unwillingness, though, is not the result of indifference, but rather the 
consequence of a legal conundrum: the current federal statutory scheme 
safeguarding indigenous cultural objects actually undermines self-
determination, and the laws that would best respect self-determination 
would prove ineffective safeguards of these objects.3 This Article offers a 
solution. Without requiring new legislation or statutes, this Article 
provides a path for the United States to easily comply with UNDRIP and 
realize its ostensibly opposed obligations. 
The United States has long been a champion of cultural objects, helping 
to prevent their looting, regulate their flow, and curb the adverse 
consequences of their illicit trafficking.4 As a robust marketplace for 
 
2. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Rep. of the International Expert Group Meeting on 
the Theme “Implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
The Role of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues and Other Indigenous-Specific Mechanisms 
(Article 42),” ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2017/10 (Feb. 13, 2017). 
3. The term “cultural objects” is used in this article as a synonym of “cultural property” and 
“cultural patrimony.” Although the different terms are often used to connote different political 
positions, the subject matter to which they refer is largely the same. See Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The 
Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 380 n.14 
(1995). The 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property defines cultural property as:  
(a) [r]are collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, and objects of 
paleontological interest; (b) property relating to history, including the history of science and 
technology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, thinkers, scientists 
and artists and to events of national importance; (c) products of archaeological excavations 
(including regular and clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; (d) elements of artistic or 
historical monuments or archaeological sites which have been dismembered, (e) antiquities 
more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; (f) objects of 
ethnological interest; (g) property of artistic interest, such as: (i) pictures, paintings and 
drawings produced entirely by hand . . . ; (ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in 
any material; (iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; (iv) original artistic 
assemblages and montages in any material; (h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, 
documents and publications of special interest . . . ; (i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, 
singly or in collections; (j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic 
archives; (k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical 
instruments. 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO 1970].  
4. The problems stemming from the illicit trade in cultural property can be divided into three 
broad categories: scientific and archaeological; matters of national identity; and economic. Looting has 
the potential to destroy both the cultural object and the historical information about it. The connection 
between looting and the destruction of cultural property was established as early as 1969 by Clemency 
Coggins, who argued that the trade in illicit art caused the loss of vital historical and archaeological 
data when cultural artifacts are hastily removed from their original locations. See Clemency Coggins, 
Illicit Traffic of Pre-Columbian Antiquities, 29 ART J. 94, 94 (1969) (investigating the 
decontextualization of Pre-Columbian artifacts). Because “the art of a society is both a manifestation 
and a mirror of its culture,” trafficking in cultural property can also threaten a state’s national identity. 












foreign cultural objects,5 the United States has developed several legal 
mechanisms for dealing with stolen cultural objects imported into the 
country, including the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation 
Act (CPIA)6 and the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA).7 But less 
congressional and scholarly attention has been devoted to America’s 
position as a “source nation,” rich in Native American cultural objects.8 
Like cultural artifacts abroad, Native American objects are subject to 
destructive plundering and trade. And there is little doubt that these 
objects are as priceless as those trafficked from abroad.  
Following years of an “apathetic posture” toward controlling its own 
indigenous cultural property, the United States is now committed to 
protecting its domestic cultural heritage.9 The United States’ affirmation of 
 
Preamble to UNESCO 1970 also documents this connection: “Considering that cultural property 
constitutes one of the basic elements of civilization and national culture, and that its true value can be 
appreciated only in relation to the fullest possible information regarding its origin, history and 
traditional setting.” UNESCO 1970, supra note 3, at 232. Other scholars, conversely, consider cultural 
property as the supranational heritage of all humankind, holding that the illicit trafficking and 
destruction of cultural objects harms not just a nation, but humankind more generally. For a 
description of the two ways of thinking, see generally John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking 
About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 831 (1986). The third harm resulting from the illicit trade 
in cultural objects is economic. After the illicit trade in drugs and illegal arms, the illegal trade in 
cultural objects represents the third most profitable illicit trade in the world. Janene Marie Podesta, 
Note, Saving Culture, but Passing the Buck: How the 1970 UNESCO Convention Undermines Its 
Goals by Unduly Targeting Market Nations, 16 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 457, 461, 461 n.15 
(2008). The $6 billion dollar trade exploits artifact-rich source nations and undermines legitimate 
attempts to regulate the art trade. See, e.g., Graham Green, Recent Development, Evaluating the 
Application of the National Stolen Property Act to Art Trafficking Cases, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 251, 
252–53 (2007).  
5. See, e.g., Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions 
on Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 449, 455 
(2004); Kimberly L. Alderman, Ethical Issues in Cultural Property Law Pertaining to Indigenous 
Peoples, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 515, 520 (2009). 
6. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2012). The CPIA implements U.S. treaty obligations under the 
1970 UNESCO Convention. UNESCO 1970, supra note 3; James A.R. Nafziger, The Protection and 
Repatriation of Indigenous Cultural Heritage in the United States, 14 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP. 
RESOL. 175, 179 (2006). 
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012).  
8. John Henry Merryman coins the terms “source nation” and “market nation” in the cultural 
patrimony context in Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property. Merryman, supra note 4, at 832 
(“In source nations, the supply of desirable cultural property exceeds the internal demand. Nations like 
Mexico, Egypt, Greece and India are obvious examples. They are rich in cultural artifacts beyond any 
conceivable local use. In market nations, the demand exceeds the supply. France, Germany, Japan, the 
Scandinavian nations, Switzerland and the United States are examples. Demand in the market nation 
encourages export from source nations. When, as is often (but not always) the case, the source nation 
is relatively poor and the market nation wealthy, an unrestricted market will encourage the net export 
of cultural property.” (citations omitted)). 
9. Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 63, 64 (1993). The Antiquities Act of 1906 was the first regulation of cultural property in the 
United States. Id. Together with the Historic Sites Act of 1935 and the National Historic Preservation 
Act of 1966, the Antiquities Act established the early framework for domestic cultural property 
protection. Id. at 68–70; see also 1 LYNDEL V. PROTT & PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, LAW AND THE 
CULTURAL HERITAGE: DISCOVERY AND EXCAVATION 65 (1984). The Archaeological Resources 











UNDRIP has obligated the United States to rethink its laws governing 
Native Americans and their cultural heritage to fully respect the right to 
self-determination.10 To do so requires lawmakers and judges to allow 
indigenous communities to define what items constitute their cultural 
patrimony. Such a decision made outside the group wrongly circumscribes 
this right. As the United States redoubles its commitment to safeguarding 
indigenous cultural property, this Article looks to the legal mechanisms 
developed in response to international looting to meet the seemingly 
paradoxical goals articulated in UNDRIP.  
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the importance of cultural 
property and the decisive role its protection plays in respecting indigenous 
rights. This Part identifies America’s dual commitment to Native 
Americans: protecting their cultural objects and respecting their self-
determination. Part II analyzes the current legal framework safeguarding 
indigenous cultural property in America, focusing on the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).11 This Part also 
explains why the current statutory scheme fails to satisfy America’s new 
policy goals concerning the protection of indigenous rights. The harms are 
not theoretical. Although tribes “win” under NAGPRA, they ultimately 
lose because they must surrender their cultural sovereignty to prevail in 
court. Part III next discusses tribal law as the ideal legal scheme for 
meeting these goals. Expounding the difficulties associated with adopting 
such a framework, this part questions whether there is a solution to what 
this article dubs the “indigenous cultural patrimony problem.” Can a law 
effectively protect Native American cultural patrimony while 
simultaneously respecting the right of indigenous peoples to exercise 
cultural self-determination?  
Through the development of the so-called “indigenous McClain 
doctrine,” this Article argues that such a legal instrument is both 
conceivable and implementable. More broadly, this Article demonstrates 
that it is possible to pass effective legislation advancing Native American 
self-determination that is consistent with broader U.S. policy goals. After 
turning to the NSPA and the McClain doctrine in Part IV, Part V 
contemplates the possibility of applying the legal instrument used to deal 
with stolen foreign cultural property to the domestic context, highlighting 
the favorability of such an approach. Finally, potential difficulties and 
 
Protection Act of 1979 further strengthened internal regulations of cultural property. Phelan, supra 
note 9, at 75. The National Museum of the American Indian Act of 1989 was a precursor to NAGPRA. 
Nafziger, supra note 6, at 179. More recently, additional protection has been realized through 
NAGPRA and the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2106 (1994). See, e.g., 
Nafziger, supra note 6, at 177–80. 
10. See infra Part I.  












recommendations are explored in the Article’s conclusion, offering a new 
way of both protecting indigenous cultural property and meeting the goals 
of UNDRIP. 
I. AMERICA’S DUAL COMMITMENT TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
By endorsing UNDRIP in December 2010, the United States assumed a 
new set of goals relating to Native Americans and indigenous cultural 
property.12 Although the Declaration is a not a legally-binding instrument 
under international law, as an official United Nations statement, it carries 
considerable moral and political force meant to guide signatories’ 
domestic policies.13 In forty-six articles, the Declaration enumerates the 
rights of indigenous peoples and sets an agenda for the United States to 
“design a reasonable approach to a progressive realization of the duties 
and responsibilities in it.”14 Consequently, current and future laws 
concerning Native Americans should be measured against the rights 
outlined in UNDRIP; if they fail to satisfy the requirements of the 
Declaration, they should be accordingly adjusted.15 Nevertheless, over the 
past six years, the United States has not satisfied its responsibilities. This 
Part briefly outlines the dual obligations the United States assumed by 
endorsing UNDRIP. 
An important right outlined by UNDRIP in Article 3 is the right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination, by virtue of which they may 
“freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development.”16 Article 4 affirms that part of exercising 
self-determination includes the right to autonomy or free government.17 
Notably, the right to self-determination is linked to the free development 
of indigenous culture, including the “right to maintain, protect and develop 
 
12. President Obama Announces U.S. Support for United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, NAT’L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.ncai.org/news/article 
s/2010/12/16/president-obama-announces-u-s-support-for-united-nations-declaration-on-the-rights-of-i 
ndigenous-peoples [https://perma.cc/F5NC-4N9D]; UNDRIP, supra note 1; see Robert T. Coulter, The 
U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 
IDAHO L. REV. 539, 546 (2009) (describing the history of the Declaration, its enactment, and 
remaining debates about its terms). 
13. Coulter, supra note 12, at 546. 
14. See Robert T. Coulter, UN Declaration Sets New Agenda for US-Indian Relations, INDIAN 
L. RESOURCE CTR. (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.indianlaw.org/undrip/un-declaration-sets-new-agenda-
us-indian-relations [https://perma.cc/3QY8-7V4Y]. 
15. The Declaration can be used as a guide and a measuring stick for laws that are now on 
the books and for laws that may be proposed. Does such a law measure up to the 
standards of the Declaration? Does the law or bill satisfy the requirements of the 
Declaration? It should. And if it does not, then it should be changed or discarded. 
Coulter, supra note 12, at 552. 
16. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 3. 
17. Id. art. 4.  











the past, present and future manifestations of [indigenous] culture[], such 
as archaeological and historical sites, [and] artefacts.”18 Article 31 
explicitly establishes the right of indigenous peoples to “maintain, control, 
protect and develop their cultural heritage.”19 Read together, these 
provisions establish the right of indigenous peoples, through their self-
government, to protect their cultural property as an exercise of self-
determination, or the right to practice what can be termed cultural self-
determination.20 As part of this cultural self-determination, indigenous 
peoples may define what constitutes their cultural patrimony and may 
develop their own cultural protection laws, importantly, without the 
intervention of the State.21  
Cultural patrimony is an important part of self-determination because 
cultural objects and cultural identity are tightly bound together.22 Cultural 
property is both a manifestation and a mirror of a society’s culture through 
which members shape their identities.23 The control of cultural properties 
is accordingly crucial to the well-being of the community connected to the 
objects.24 If others control the objects—or determine which objects are 
important or unimportant—the community in question is deprived of an 
essential part of its self-determination. When the international community 
first recognized the right to self-determination, the right was therefore not 
confined to allowing peoples to freely determine their political status “by 
and for themselves,” but was extended to cultural matters as well.25 
Recognizing self-determination also includes respecting the “right of 
peoples to choose their cultural system and freely pursue their cultural 
development.”26 Each group has a right to its own cultural identity.27 
 
18. Id. art. 11(1).  
19. Id. art. 31(1).  
20. Angelique EagleWoman, Cultural and Economic Self-Determination for Tribal Peoples in 
the United States Supported by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 28 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 357, 360 (2010) (describing cultural self-determination). 
21. Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the 
Federal Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 369 (2009) (asserting that true self-determination means the ability 
to implement any mode of government without the interference of the federal government). Just as 
self-determination means that “indigenous peoples have the right to govern themselves, free from 
outside interference and control,” cultural self-determination would be similarly free from outside 
interference and control. Steven J. Gunn, Introduction: Contemporary and Comparative Perspectives 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 155, 156 (2005). 
22. DEREK GILLMAN, THE IDEA OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 47 (rev. ed. 2010).  
23. See Bator, supra note 4, at 304. 
24. This is considered “cultural nationalism” and is one of many ways of thinking about 
cultural property. See, e.g., Merryman, supra note 4, at 846.  
25. Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in CULTURAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS 41, 53 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008) (citation omitted).  
26. Id. at 54 (quoting Aureliu Cristescu (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities), The Right to Self-Determination: 
Historical and Current Development on the Basis of United Nations Instruments, ¶ 83, U.N. Doc. 












This is particularly true for indigenous peoples, whose cultures have 
been systemically undermined by colonial powers. Many scholars consider 
cultural sovereignty “the bedrock of Native peoples’ self-determination.”28 
Others believe that self-determination constitutes not the ground but the 
“protective shell around tribal life and culture.”29 The competing 
conceptions highlight how closely tribal self-determination and culture are 
intertwined. Erica-Irene Daes accounts for the strength of the connection 
between self-determination and cultural property for indigenous peoples 
by explaining that “[i]ndigenous peoples regard all products of the human 
mind and heart as interrelated, and as flowing from the same source: the 
relationships between the people and their land, [and] their kinship with 
the other living creatures that share the land.”30 Unsurprisingly, then, 
UNDRIP crystallizes the right of indigenous groups to self-determination, 
including cultural self-determination.  
The United States has made a dual commitment to indigenous peoples.31 
To meet the standards outlined by the U.N. Declaration, the United States 
must both create effective protections of indigenous cultural patrimony 
and respect the right of indigenous people to cultural self-determination.32 
The next Part will evaluate whether current U.S. laws respecting Native 
American rights and laws protecting Native American cultural objects 
satisfy these new requirements.  
II. NAGPRA 
This part will provide an overview of NAGRPA, the primary legal 
vehicle for protecting Native American cultural property in the United 
 
27. This has been a long-established principle of the United Nations. See, e.g., General 
Conference, Draft Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, ¶ 3(5), U.N. Doc. 20/C/18, annex (Sept. 
25, 1978).  
28. Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural 
Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191, 209 (2001). 
29. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV. 797, 804–
05 (2006). 
30. ERICA-IRENE DAES, PROTECTION OF THE HERITAGE OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, at iii, U.N. 
Sales No. E.97.XIV.3 (1997).  
31. The U.S. commitment to Native Americans stems not just from the recent affirmation of 
UNDRIP, but American jurisprudence as well. Today, the Court is a defender of Indian tribal rights, 
including the right to self-determination. As evidenced by Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged Native Americans’ “unique legal status,” id. at 546, and that the 
trust relationship is now fulfilled by promoting self-government, “turning over to the Indians a greater 
control of their own destinies.” Id. at 553. From the viewpoint of current U.S. case law, self-
determination is therefore more than a shell protecting culture. Nevertheless, because of the continuous 
shifts in Federal Indian policy, discussed infra Part III, the commitment to respecting tribal self-
determination is stronger if grounded in the U.N. Declaration rather than in a congressional act or 
Supreme Court decision. See discussion infra Part III. 
32. The Declaration obligates signatory states to take “effective measures” to protect this self-
determination, as well as the group’s cultural heritage. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 31(2). 











States.33 After discussing the criminal provisions of the statute, this Part 
will analyze the three principal trafficking cases litigated under NAGPRA, 
highlighting the shortcomings of the Act. By relying on practices that 
actually undermine tribal cultural self-determination, NAGPRA ultimately 
fails to respect indigenous rights and dependably safeguard Native 
American cultural property. 
Since the landing of the Mayflower, pothunters, soldiers, museum 
officials, scientists, and government agents have collected Native 
American cultural objects and human remains for the sake of profit, 
science, and entertainment.34 In response to these enduring abuses, Native 
Americans launched a collaborative national effort in 1986 to secure 
legislation for the protection of human remains and cultural artifacts and 
for their repatriation to Indian tribes.35 The result, NAGPRA, was enacted 
by Congress in 1990 to “protect Native American burial sites and the 
removal of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of 
cultural patrimony on Federal, Indian and Native Hawaiian lands.”36 
To meet this goal, NAGPRA established three sets of provisions.37 The 
first governs the discovery and excavation of Native American remains 
and cultural items on federal or tribal lands.38 The second provision 
regulates the identification, consultation, inventory, and repatriation 
procedure for Native American remains and cultural items in the 
possession of federal agencies and federally-funded museums.39 Finally, a 
third provision, “[t]ucked into the middle” of NAGPRA,40 creates a new 
law criminalizing trafficking in Native American human remains and 
cultural items.41 To protect Native American objects from future plunder 
and marketing, NAGPRA proscribes “financially benefitting from a 
protected item, without the right of possession.”42 NAGPRA’s criminal 
provision thus prohibits “the knowing sale, purchase, use for profit, or 
 
33. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006). Several other laws are also aimed at preventing the 
destruction of cultural objects, for example the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. 
L. No. 96–95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2012)). For a brief 
discussion of other acts and the development of NAGPRA, see Sherry Hutt, Illegal Trafficking in 
Native American Human Remains and Cultural Items: A New Protection Tool, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 135, 
136–42 (1992). 
34. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 40 (1992). 
35. Id. at 54–58. 
36. H.R. REP. NO. 101-877, at 8 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4367, 4367. 
37. See C. Timothy McKeown & Sherry Hutt, In the Smaller Scope of Conscience: The Native 
American Graves Protection & Repatriation Act Twelve Years After, 21 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
153, 156 (2003). 
38. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (2012).  
39. Id. §§ 3003–3005. 
40. Hutt, supra note 33, at 135. 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2012).  












transportation for sale or profit of two categories of Native American 
objects—human remains and cultural items.”43 This Article focuses on 
cultural items. 
Under NAGPRA, “cultural items” include funerary objects,44 sacred 
objects,45 and cultural patrimony.46 The Act defines “cultural patrimony” 
as an “object having ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance 
central to the Native American group or culture itself.”47 The definition 
goes on to distinguish cultural patrimony from property that is owned by 
an individual Native American. Cultural patrimony, “therefore, cannot be 
alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by an individual regardless of 
whether . . . the individual is a member of the Indian tribe.”48 Trafficking 
 
43. Roberto Iraola, A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions of the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 431, 434–35 (2004) (footnote 
omitted). Hutt describes this as the “financial incident,” which places the burden on the prosecution to 
“prove some financial incident attendant to the violation.” Hutt, supra note 33, at 145. This 
requirement excludes museum and institutional transfers of Native American objects for study and 
allows private individuals to return items to the appropriate tribe without exposing them to criminal 
liability. As Hutt explains, “[t]he focus on financial motivation goes to the heart of NAGPRA” because 
the Act’s purpose is to protect burial sites and cultural objects from looting by curtailing market 
trading. Id. 
44. Under NAGPRA, there are two classes of funerary objects. “Associated funerary objects” 
encompass: 
[O]bjects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to 
have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later, and both 
the human remains and associated funerary objects are presently in the possession or control 
of a Federal agency or museum, except that other items exclusively made for burial purposes 
or to contain human remains shall be considered as associated funerary objects. 
25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(A) (2012).  
“Unassociated funerary objects” include: 
[O]bjects that, as a part of the death rite or ceremony of a culture, are reasonably believed to 
have been placed with individual human remains either at the time of death or later, where the 
remains are not in the possession or control of the Federal agency or museum and the objects 
can be identified by a preponderance of the evidence as related to specific individuals or 
families or to known human remains or, by a preponderance of the evidence, as having been 
removed from a specific burial site of an individual culturally affiliated with a particular 
Indian tribe.  
Id. § 3001(3)(B). 
45. “Sacred objects” are “specific ceremonial objects which are needed by traditional Native 
American religious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American religions by their present 
day adherents.” Id. § 3001(3)(C). 
46. Id. § 3001(3)(D). 
47. Id. Zuni War Gods and Confederacy Wampum Belts of the Iroquois are identified as 
examples of objects of cultural patrimony by federal regulations. 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(d)(4) (2018). 
Considered “communal tribal property . . . not to be displayed, traded, or sold,” Zuni War Gods are 
hand-carved wooden figures which “are considered vital to Zuni spiritual health.” ANDREW 
GULLIFORD, SACRED OBJECTS AND SACRED PLACES: PRESERVING TRIBAL TRADITIONS 43–44 (2000). 
Wampum belts are “ritual objects of great spiritual significance” that often symbolize treaties between 
tribes and states or nations. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS TOGETHER: AMERICAN INDIAN 
TREATY VISIONS OF LAW AND PEACE, 1600–1800, at 51–52 (1997). 
48. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2012). To be considered cultural patrimony, the object must also 
“have been considered inalienable by such Native American group at the time the object was separated 
from such group.” Id.  











in Native American cultural items is illegal where they have been obtained 
in violation of the Act, broadly covering items discovered on tribal or 
federal lands that are not turned over to their Native American owners, as 
well as objects obtained without the voluntary consent of the Native 
American group with the authority of alienation.49 
A first conviction for illegally trafficking in Native American cultural 
items is a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in prison.50 
Subsequent offenses are felonies, carrying a sentence of up to five years in 
prison. For each misdemeanor offense, a violator may be fined up to 
$100,000.51 Felony offense fines are set at up to $250,000.52 As a general-
intent crime, the offense of illegal trafficking in Native American cultural 
items requires that the defendant knowingly engaged in a financial 
activity, but does not require knowledge that the item at issue is protected 
under NAGPRA.53 Importantly, while there must be a financial incident 
for a violation to occur, no specific financial or commercial value must be 
attached to the protected item to trigger NAGPRA’s criminal provision.54 
It is also possible for tribes to file civil actions for violations of NAGPRA, 
but these are limited to objects already held by museums and not 
trafficking cases.55 
In its first twenty-five years, NAGPRA has successfully secured the 
return of hundreds of thousands of cultural objects.56 Moreover, the 
criminal provision of NAGPRA has been productively used to prosecute 
illegal trafficking, helping to eliminate the profit incentive that motivates 
looters of Native American cultural items.57 Although there have been 
 
49. See SHERRY HUTT ET AL., HERITAGE RESOURCES LAW: PROTECTING THE 
ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT 234, 237 (1999). 
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1170 (2012). There is an exception for remains and objects “excavated, 
exhumed, or otherwise obtained with full knowledge and consent of the next of kin or the official 
governing body of the appropriate culturally affiliated Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization.” 
25 U.S.C. § 3001(13) (2012). 
51. 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) (2012). 
52. Id. § 3571(b)(3). A corporation can be fined up to $200,000 for a misdemeanor offense and 
up to $500,000 for a felony offense. Id. § 3571(c)(3), (5). 
53. Hutt, supra note 33, at 146. No profit needs to be realized in order to violate NAGPRA’s 
trafficking provision, so long as the Native American items were transported for intended sale or 
profit. Id.  
54. Id. at 142. 
55. “Any museum that fails to comply with the requirements of this chapter may be assessed a 
civil penalty by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to procedures established by the Secretary 
through regulation.” 25 U.S.C. § 3007(a) (2012). The civil penalties, however, do not reach individuals 
trafficking in Native American cultural objects. See id. 
56. Steven J. Gunn, The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act at Twenty: 
Reaching the Limits of Our National Consensus, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 503, 506 (2010). 
57. See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 25 J. LAND 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 278 (2005) (naming NAGPRA’s criminal provision a “major tool . . . 












numerous prosecutions under NAGPRA,58 there are only three reported 
appellate cases concerning NAGPRA’s criminal provision under § 
1170(b) for trafficking in cultural items.59 Collectively, they have 
established the precedent that lower courts follow when deciding 
NAGPRA disputes. After briefly discussing the facts of each case, this 
Part will examine the grounds on which the courts concluded that the 
defendants had illegally trafficked in Native American cultural items. 
Analyzing the case history reveals two fundamental shortcomings with 
American domestic cultural property protection laws: NAGPRA does not 
provide a permanent protection for indigenous property, and NAGPRA 
does not fully respect Native Americans’ right to cultural self-
determination. 
A. Case Law 
1. Corrow 
In United States v. Corrow,60 the defendant challenged the 
constitutionality of NAGPRA’s definition of “cultural patrimony.”61 
Corrow, a non-Indian artifacts collector knowledgeable about Navajo 
traditions and culture, was convicted for trafficking in protected Native 
American cultural items in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b) by purchasing 
ceremonial Navajo masks (Yei B’Chei),62 headdresses, and Navajo 
religious artifacts and subsequently attempting to sell them.63 By 
explaining that he intended to deliver the masks to a young Navajo 
chanter, Corrow obtained the cultural items from the eighty-one-year-old 
widow of a Navajo hataali religious singer. Corrow then tried to sell the 
items to an undercover National Park Service ranger posing as a buyer in 
an elaborate sting operation.64 
 
58. For a discussion of NAGPRA litigation, see generally id. at 269–85. 
59. See United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kramer, 168 
F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997). Several 
prosecutions under NAGPRA’s criminal provision have also resulted in plea agreements. Sherry Hutt 
& C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as Human Rights Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363, 
385 (1999). 
60. 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997). 
61. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D) (2012).  
62. As the court explains:  
Yei B’Chei or Yei B’Chei jish are ceremonial adornments, Native American artifacts whose 
English label, “masks,” fails to connote the Navajo perception these cultural items embody 
living gods. Traditionally, a hataali passes the Yei B’Chei to a family or clan member who 
has studied the ceremonies or loans the Yei B’Chei to another Navajo clan . . . .  
Corrow, 119 F.3d at 798. 
63. United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1556 (D.N.M. 1996). 
64. Id. Corrow was also convicted under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act for being in possession 
of protected feathers. Id. at 1557. 











On appeal, the defendant argued that the definition of cultural 
patrimony under NAGPRA was unconstitutionally vague and challenged 
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction.65 To meet the 
statutory definition of cultural patrimony, the government had to establish 
that the trafficked objects “(1) w[ere] not owned by an individual Native 
American; (2) . . . could not be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed by an 
individual; and (3) had an ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural 
importance central to the Native American group.”66 Contending that the 
first and second elements of the definition were unintelligible, Corrow 
argued that his due process was violated because the statute had failed to 
give ordinary people notice about what conduct was prohibited.67 In the 
district court case, Corrow also challenged the third element of the 
definition, arguing that “there was nothing unique about the[] Yei 
B’Chei.”68 
In response to the defendant’s argument that the conflicting evidence 
on the alienability of the Navajo items “sufficiently clouds the meaning of 
‘cultural patrimony’ to render it unconstitutional,”69 the court evaluated 
the vagueness challenge based on the facts of the case. At trial, a medicine 
man testified on behalf of Corrow, and an ordained hataali as well as a 
Navajo anthropologist testified for the government about the inalienability 
of the Yei B’Chei.70 Despite the disparate views on alienability, the court 
dismissed Corrow’s void-for-vagueness challenge. Because Corrow was 
familiar with Navajo culture, and “would have been aware that various 
tribal members viewed ownership of property differently,”71 the court 
distinguished the defendant from an “unsuspecting tourist,” noting that 
Corrow had “some notice the Yei B'Chei he purchased were powerfully 
connected to Navajo religion and culture.”72 Admitting that “the 
parameters of the designation ‘cultural patrimony’ might be unclear in 
some of its applications and at its edges,” the court nevertheless held that 
the defendant had notice that the Native American objects were cultural 
patrimony, given the facts of the case.73 
 
65. Corrow, 119 F. 3d at 798. The defendant also argued that the court should read a scienter 
requirement into the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. Id.  
66. Id. at 801 (referencing elements of 25 U.S.C. §3001(3)(D)). 
67. Id. This would not discourage the law’s arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, 
according to the defendant. Id.  
68. Id. at 801 n.6 (noting that Corrow dropped his argument about the cultural importance of 
the Native American items, targeting instead the question of alienability). 
69. Id. at 802. 
70. Id. at 801. 
71. Id. at 803 (quoting United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1561 (D.N.M. 1996)). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 803, 804. The court also noted that the notice must be “reasonably obtainable,” not 












After settling the issue of notice, the court considered whether the law 
was arbitrarily or discriminatorily applied.74 In so doing, the court 
examined the process followed by law enforcement personnel to determine 
whether the Native American items constituted cultural patrimony. In 
United States v. Corrow, a Department of the Interior National Park 
Service officer, Phillip Young, undertook several steps to verify the 
importance of the Yei B’Chei to the Navajo before concluding that the 
objects were cultural patrimony. Young “examined a photograph of the 
Yei B’Chei and discussed their significance with other knowledgeable 
Park Service officers.”75 Additionally, Young consulted “representatives 
of the Navajo Nation.”76 Because the statute prompted the law 
enforcement officer to interview several sources before deciding that the 
items had “ongoing historical, cultural, or traditional importance” to the 
Native American tribe, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that 
the definition of “cultural patrimony” sufficiently prevented the arbitrary 
and discriminatory application of the law.77 Holding that “a rational jury 
could find beyond a reasonable doubt the Yei B’Chei are cultural 
patrimony which Mr. Corrow could not resell for profit,” the court 
affirmed Corrow’s conviction for illegal trafficking under NAGPRA.78 
2. Tidwell 
The second case also concerns a vagueness challenge to NAGPRA’s 
trafficking provision, centering again on the definition of cultural 
patrimony.79 In United States v. Tidwell, the defendant appealed from his 
jury conviction of seven counts of illegal trafficking in Native American 
cultural items under 18 U.S.C. § 1170.80 In an undercover investigation, a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs agent purchased Native American items from 
Tidwell, including eleven Hopi masks, known as Kwaatsi or Kachina, and 
priest robes from the Pueblo of Acoma.81 At trial, the government 
introduced expert witnesses on Native American culture who testified that 
the items at issue were prohibited from being sold under NAGPRA.82 
Tidwell, in defense, introduced Native Americans who testified that the 
 
74. Id. at 804.  
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 804–05. 
78. Id. at 805. 
79. United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1999). 
80. The defendant was also convicted of “conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, . . . eleven counts 
of theft of tribal property under 18 U.S.C. § 1163, and one count of trafficking in unlawfully removed 
archaeological resources under 16 U.S.C. § 470ee.” Id. at 979. 
81. Id. 
82. Id.  











masks were inauthentic and were not cultural items protected by 
NAGPRA.83 Like Corrow, Tidwell challenged the definition of “cultural 
patrimony” as vague, but focused on the second and third elements: an 
object’s “inalienability” and its “ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural 
importance” to a Native American group.84 Tidwell maintained that he did 
not have fair notice that his conduct was proscribed by NAGPRA because 
the key terms were defined by Native Americans, whose law regarding 
cultural patrimony was unwritten, rendering fair notice impossible.85 
Echoing Corrow, Tidwell also pointed to the conflicting evidence of the 
objects’ status as cultural property as proof of the uncertainty of the law.86 
Adopting the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit in Corrow, the court 
emphasized Tidwell’s position as a dealer in Native American art, holding 
that “he had sufficient understanding of Native American art and the 
NAGPRA to know that he would have to inquire further or consult an 
expert when he purchased the items.”87 Further relying on Corrow, the 
court also held that NAGPRA does not promote arbitrary application 
because law enforcement officials must undertake consultations about an 
item’s cultural patrimony status before investigating and arresting a 
subject.88 The court, therefore, rejected the defendant’s vagueness 
challenge and affirmed his convictions as supported by sufficient 
evidence.89 
3. Kramer 
In United States v. Kramer, the defendant challenged the denial of his 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea to illegally trafficking in Native 
American cultural items in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1170(b).90 Before the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Kramer argued that his initial guilty plea 
was involuntary, based on extreme illness and ineffective counsel.91 For 
over twenty years, defendant Kramer profitably sold Native American 
items, but in 1996, Kramer was charged with multiple offenses for 
attempting to sell a tablita, a prayer stick containing bird feathers, and a 
sun disk.92 In the court’s estimation, “[a]ll three items were considered 
 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 980. For the NAGPRA definition of cultural property, see supra notes 44–49 and 
accompanying text.  
85. Tidwell, 191 F.3d at 980.  
86. Id.  
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 982. 
90. United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1999). 













religious and cultural objects bearing significant ritual status.”93 On 
appeal, Kramer claimed that his attorney failed to investigate whether the 
items were actually “cultural patrimony,” as defined in 25 U.S.C. 
§ 3001(3)(D).94 Based on his counsel’s ineffectiveness at trial, Kramer 
argued that his plea was involuntary.95 The court, however, held that it 
would have been “fruitless” for counsel to have claimed that the items 
were not cultural patrimony.96 The ruling was based primarily on the 
defendant’s failure to dispute the items’ patrimony status in response to 
the court’s inquiry at the plea hearing.97  
The court made special note that Kramer actually corrected the court on 
this count. Reviewing the procedural history, the Tenth Circuit explained 
that, when the district court originally asked the defendant whether the 
items he offered for sale were sacred objects, “Kramer corrected the court 
by responding, ‘Patrimony items, as opposed to sacred, I believe.’”98  
Secondarily, the court based its decision on the readiness of tribal 
witnesses to testify that the items were considered inalienable objects.99 In 
light of the evidence available, and the defendant’s correction of the 
objects’ status, the court held that Kramer’s guilty plea was voluntary and 
that the disputed items constituted cultural patrimony protected by 
NAGPRA.100 
B. Shortcomings of NAGPRA 
As the three reported appellate decisions indicate, NAGPRA has met its 
initial goal of creating an effective legal sanction to dissuade and punish 
commercially motivated looters through its criminal trafficking 
provision.101 That success, however, is largely limited to prosecuting 
knowledgeable dealers trafficking in Native American cultural objects. 
 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1201. 
95. Id. at 1200. Kramer also argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, 
maintaining that NAGPRA was established to facilitate the return of cultural objects from agencies 
and museums, not individuals. Id. at 1201. Citing Corrow and NAGPRA’s legislative history, the 
Tenth Circuit rejected the jurisdictional claim, holding that the criminal provision to which Kramer 
plead guilty encompasses violations by individual traders such as the defendant. Id. at 1201–02. 
96. Id. at 1201. 
97. Id.  
98. Id. at 1201 n.3. 
99. Id. at 1201. And, thirdly, on the lack of evidence supporting Kramer’s assertion that the 
items were not communally owned. Id. 
100. Id. at 1201–02.  
101. See supra Parts II.A.1–3. This was the same motivation driving the passage of the 
Archaeological Resources Protection Act in 1979. See PROTT & O’KEEFE, supra note 9, at 64. Other 
scholars, conversely, believe that NAGPRA’s criminal provision needs strengthening to curb the 
growing black market for Native American cultural objects. See, e.g., Suzan Shown Harjo, Native 
Peoples’ Cultural and Human Rights: An Unfinished Agenda, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321, 326 (1992). 











With the recent endorsement of UNDRIP, the United States assumed new 
goals related to protecting indigenous cultural property. Today, regulating 
illegal trafficking is only one part of a multidimensional policy of 
respecting Native American rights. Laws designed to protect cultural 
objects must now also respect cultural self-determination. As applied, 
NAGPRA’s criminal provision fails to fully respect indigenous rights on 
two counts: NAGPRA does not guarantee permanent protection of Native 
American cultural objects and NAGPRA actually undermines indigenous 
cultural self-determination. 
1. NAGPRA Frustrates the Free Exercise of Cultural Self-
Determination 
In Corrow, the defendant challenged as unconstitutionally vague the 
first two elements of the statutory definition of cultural patrimony: that the 
Yei B’Chei he trafficked “(1) w[ere] not owned by an individual Native 
American; [and] (2) . . . could not be alienated, appropriated, or conveyed 
by an individual.”102 To dismiss the vagueness challenge, the court had to 
determine whether the defendant was put on notice that his behavior was 
prohibited and decide whether the law was arbitrarily or discriminatorily 
applied.103 In each determination, the court undercut the tribe’s ability to 
exercise its cultural determination.  
To evaluate whether Corrow had fair notice, the Tenth Circuit 
considered expert testimony from a variety of witnesses to determine 
whether the Yei B’Chei were inalienable and communally owned.104 An 
ordained Navajo hataali testified for the government that “the Yei B’Chei 
must remain within the four sacred mountains of the Navajo for they 
represented the ‘heartbeat’ of the Navajo people.”105 An anthropologist, 
Harry Walters, also testified for the government, declaring that there is “no 
such thing as ownership of medicine bundles and that these are viewed as 
 
102. United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 801 (10th Cir. 1997). These two elements are a part 
of NAGPRA’s definition of “cultural patrimony” under 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3)(D). 
103. Corrow, 119 F.3d at 803–05. 
104. Id. at 801. 
105. Id. 
He stated, “This is my heartbeat, this is my life, this is my teaching. This causes me to behave 
right. It allows me to teach my children to behave. So it's a God-given gift to the Navajos and 
it has everything to do with the welfare and the health and wisdom.” He explained the hataali 
is responsible for caring for the jish, restoring them in the event of exposure to the wrong 
people or places: “when they do come back we would have to use what we call a diagnosis to 
see what can be done and how we can treat them and bring them back to the respect that they 
should have.” He explained the Navajo tradition of compensating a person who gives his Yei 
B’Chei to another chanter.  












living entities.”106 In support of Corrow, Jackson Gillis, a “medicine man 
from Monument Valley,” testified that Yei B’Chei may pass to the widow 
of the singer if clan relatives or other singers do not claim the masks.107 
Summarizing Gillis’s testimony, the court explained, “[i]f the widow feels 
uncomfortable keeping the [masks] . . . she has the right to sell them.”108 
Another Navajo witness for the defendant, Harrison Begay, similarly 
testified that the Yei B’Chei may be sold if the widow felt “uneasy about 
their remaining unused.”109 Finally, Billy Yellow, another hataali, testified 
on behalf of Corrow, confirming the disposition of the Yei B’Chei 
described by the other witnesses.110 The conflicting evidence, marshaled 
by the defendant to support his void-for-vagueness argument, was 
characterized by the amicus curiae “as a conflict between orthodox and 
moderate Navajo religious views.”111  
In the discussion of whether NAGPRA was arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily applied, the court described the process of determining 
cultural affiliation, further highlighting the court’s intrusion on indigenous 
self-determination. According to the Tenth Circuit, a Park Service officer 
determined that the Yei B’Chei constitute cultural patrimony.112 Following 
the sting operation that resulted in Corrow’s indictment, Young “examined 
a photograph of the Yei B’Chei and discussed their significance with other 
knowledgeable Park Service officers and representatives of the Navajo 
Nation.”113 Considering the evidence, Young “concluded that the Yei 
B’Chei were items having ‘ongoing historical, traditional or cultural 
importance’ to the Navajo people.”114 In addition to the officer’s 
consultations, the district court clarified that it is “apparent from the 
language of the statute that law enforcement personnel also must decide 
whether or not an item is property owned by an individual Native 
American because if it is the item is alienable.”115 Based on these two acts, 
the district court then concluded that “the statutory language of NAGPRA 
 




110. Id.  
111. Id. “The Antique Tribal Art Dealers Association, a trade organization promoting 
authenticity and ethical dealing in the sale of Native American artifacts, filed an amicus brief 
contending the government in this case ‘exploited a controversy between orthodox and moderate 
Navajo religious perspectives.’” Id. at 801 n.7. 
112. Id. at 804. 
113. Id.. According to the district court, Young also discussed the Yei B'Chei with the 
undercover agent, James William Tanner, who had posed as a private collector; Dave Burgee, a retired 
Park Service curator and specialist in Navajo culture; and William Yazzie, a National Park Service law 
enforcement ranger. United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1564 (D.N.M. 1996). 
114. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. at 1564. 
115. Id. 











defining ‘cultural patrimony’ provides sufficient objective guidance to law 
enforcement personnel to avoid the likelihood of arbitrary 
enforcement.”116 Relying on the evidence presented at trial and the 
decisions of the Park Service agents, the Tenth Circuit ultimately held that 
“a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt the Yei B’Chei are 
cultural patrimony which Mr. Corrow could not resell for profit.”117 
As applied in United States v. Corrow, NAGPRA harmfully interferes 
with the ability of Native Americans to freely exercise their cultural self-
determination. If self-determination encompasses the right to define what 
items constitute cultural patrimony, any decision about what can be 
considered cultural patrimony made from outside the group wrongly 
circumscribes that right. Here, the court acknowledged the internal dispute 
among the Navajo about whether the Yei B’Chei were inalienable.118 
Accordingly, to respect cultural self-determination, the final decision 
about the objects’ status should have been with the group whose cultural 
patrimony was at stake. Instead, the court in Corrow made the decision 
about the objects’ cultural status. As the court noted, it was a Park Service 
officer who first “concluded” that the items in question were cultural 
patrimony.119 Determining cultural patrimony, therefore, is encompassed 
in the degree of police judgment the court finds acceptable. Based on this 
judgment and the conflicting expert testimony, the Tenth Circuit held that 
a jury could have properly weighed the evidence and reasonably found 
that the Yei B’Chei constituted cultural patrimony.120 In so holding, the 
court not only upheld Corrow’s conviction, meaning the masks could not 
be trafficked under NAGPRA, but also decided that the Yei B’Chei 
constitute cultural patrimony, circumscribing the tribes’ free exercise of 
cultural self-determination in the process. 
Although this outcome satisfies the obligation to protect indigenous 
cultural items, the means of securing the protection frustrate the goal of 
self-determination. Under UNDRIP the indigenous community itself 
should determine what constitutes its cultural property. To respect this 
right, instead of admitting the possibility that a rational jury could make 
the decision, the court should defer to the tribal body. After the tribe 
determines the status of the Yei B’Chei, the court could incorporate that 
decision into its ruling. Otherwise, the court is actively preventing the free 
 
116. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 977 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 1992)) (“Effective law 
enforcement often ‘requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment.’”).  
117. Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805. 
118. See supra notes 104–11. 
119. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. at 1564. 












exercise of cultural self-determination by making a ruling on the internal 
debate.  
A similar impairment of cultural self-determination occurs in United 
States v. Tidwell and United States v. Kramer. In Tidwell, the government 
“introduced a number of experts on Native American religion and culture 
who testified that the masks and the robes were prohibited from being sold 
under the NAGPRA.”121 In his defense, Tidwell “introduced testimony of 
Native Americans who testified that the masks were . . . not the type of 
cultural item protected by the NAGPRA.”122 Although the Ninth Circuit 
does not discuss the witnesses’ tribal status, what is at stake from the 
perspective of cultural self-determination is the recognition of the internal 
dispute about the objects’ cultural status and who resolves the conflict. In 
the original trial, the jury found that Tidwell was guilty of illegal 
trafficking in Native American cultural items under 18 U.S.C. § 1170, 
signifying that it was the jury that ultimately decided that the Kwaatsi and 
robes at issue constituted cultural property.123  
Moreover, the court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to 
uphold Tidwell’s conviction.124 By upholding the conviction, the Ninth 
Circuit suppressed indigenous peoples’ cultural self-determination in two 
ways. Like the Tenth Circuit in Corrow, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the 
position that where there is conflicting testimony about what constitutes 
cultural patrimony, the decision is left to the court and law enforcement 
officers. Furthermore, the Court in Tidwell ruled on what comprises 
sufficient evidence to make a decision about cultural patrimony. As a 
result, indigenous peoples lost the power to determine what constitutes 
their cultural patrimony and even lost the ability to evaluate the 
sufficiency of the evidence considered. 
Even fewer details are discussed in Kramer.125 Here, the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s denial of Kramer’s motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea by looking to the facts surrounding Kramer’s original 
pleading.126 Unlike the courts in Corrow and Tidwell, the court in Kramer 
refused to consider whether the items at issue constituted cultural 
patrimony, essentially holding that there is no way that the tablita, prayer 
stick, and sun disk could not be considered cultural patrimony.127 
Although upon first consideration this decision seemingly respects 
 
121. United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1999). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 982. 
125. United States v. Kramer, 168 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 1999). 
126. Id. at 1201–03. 
127. Recall that the court held that it would have been “fruitless” for counsel to have claimed 
that the items were not cultural patrimony. Id. at 1201. 











indigenous rights by offering broad protection of cultural objects, the 
court’s ruling profoundly frustrates self-determination.  
In Kramer, the basis for the court’s decision was not the analysis of the 
Jemez tribal witnesses, who “would have testified that the items were 
authentic tribal cultural and religious items and were considered 
inalienable objects.”128 In fact, the tribal witnesses never testified at all. 
Instead, the court placed special emphasis on Kramer’s own statement that 
objects were “[p]atrimony items, as opposed to sacred [objects].”129 
Focusing on Kramer’s designation, the court determined that no discussion 
was necessary, accepting the objects as cultural patrimony. Consequently, 
the defendant defined what constituted the tribe’s cultural patrimony. And 
by accepting his judgment, the court circumscribed the group’s 
prerogative to exercise cultural self-determination guaranteed by 
UNDRIP. 
To convict art dealers for illegally trafficking in Native American 
cultural objects, NAGPRA requires a finding that the items at issue are 
objects of cultural patrimony. Whether it is the court, jury, or even the 
defendant who pronounces that an object can be considered cultural 
patrimony, in making and accepting these decisions, the court frustrates 
the free exercise of cultural self-determination when it applies NAGPRA 
to criminal cases. If self-determination is to be respected, internal disputes 
about what constitutes cultural patrimony must be left up to the indigenous 
group from which the cultural objects derive. As applied, in its attempt to 
protect cultural objects, NAGPRA’s criminal provision actually 
undermines cultural self-determination. A broader consideration of 
NAGPRA in light of Federal Indian law, however, reveals that even the 
goal of protecting cultural objects may not be fully met by NAGPRA. 
2. NAGPRA Does Not Dependably Protect Indigenous Cultural 
Property 
By failing to establish a permanent legal mechanism for protecting 
Native American cultural property, NAGPRA also falls short of meeting 
the cultural property protection goals outlined by UNDRIP, which 
obligates signatory states to take effective measures to protect the cultural 
objects of indigenous peoples.130 Because NAGPRA can be revoked any 
 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 1201 n.3. 












time under the congressional plenary power over Indian affairs, NAGPRA 
is not a dependable legal protection.131 
As the Supreme Court noted in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
Congressional authority over Indian matters is “extraordinarily broad.”132 
Based on the discovery doctrine, which left the aboriginal inhabitants of 
America with only a “right of occupancy,”133 the United States assumed 
 
131. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886) (first acknowledgment of 
congressional plenary power); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (“We must presume 
that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the Indians . . . .”). In addition to the 
plenary power, NAGPRA may be undependable because of its potential vagueness. The first statute in 
the United States to regulate control of cultural property on federal lands was the Antiquities Act of 
1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2012)). This act 
created penalties for destroying or damaging historic ruins on public lands, and prohibited the 
appropriation, destruction, or damage of any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of 
antiquity on lands owned or controlled by the federal government. Id. Congress, however, failed to 
clearly define many of the key terms, including “object of antiquity.” In 1974, the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled the Antiquities Act unconstitutional in United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 
1974). Diaz had “appropriated . . . masks found in a cave on the San Carlos Indian Reservation” that 
were identified as having recently been made by a medicine man. Id. at 114. Although the masks were 
used in religious ceremonies by the Apache Indians and never allowed off the reservations, Diaz found 
and removed the masks and was subsequently convicted for violating the Antiquities Act for 
appropriating objects of antiquities from government land. Id. at 113–14. At trial, an anthropologist 
testified that an “object of antiquity” includes objects “made just yesterday if [they] relate[] to 
religious or social traditions of long standing.” Id. at 114. On appeal, Diaz argued that the term “object 
of antiquity” is unclear, contending that the act should be void for vagueness. See id. The Ninth Circuit 
agreed, noting that the word “antiquity” may refer to both the age and use of the objects, which may 
not be common knowledge. Id. at 115. The court in Diaz explained that “a statute which either forbids 
or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.” 
Id. at 114 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). For a fuller history of the 
Antiquities Act, see generally Raymond Harris Thompson, “An Old and Reliable Authority”: 
Introduction, 42 J. SW. 191 (2000). The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for finding the Antiquities Act 
unconstitutional closely parallels NAGPRA cases, which also contend that a key term, “cultural 
patrimony,” is not clearly defined. See supra Part II.A. Thus far, the void-for-vagueness challenges 
brought against NAGPRA have failed, in part because well-established dealers, knowledgeable in 
Native American culture, have been convicted, allowing the courts to rule that the defendants should 
have known better. See supra notes 71–73, 87 and accompanying text. If Native American objects 
were trafficked by non-experts and these “men of common intelligence” would have to guess at the 
meaning of the statute, however, it seems likely that such a void-for-vagueness argument could prevail 
along the lines of Diaz. 499 F.2d at 114 (quoting Connally, 269 U.S. at 391). 
132. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978). As Struve observes, “[t]his view is 
doctrinally well-established but often criticized.” Catherine T. Struve, Sovereign Litigants: Native 
American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L. REV. 929, 929 n.2 (2010).  
133. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 585 (1823) (holding that it “has never been doubted, that 
either the United States, or the several States, had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary lines 
described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy, and that the exclusive power to 
extinguish that right, was vested in that government which might constitutionally exercise it”). 











exclusive federal power over the indigenous population,134 a principle 
affirmed in the Constitution’s Indian Commerce Clause.135 Building on 
Marshall’s conception of tribes as “domestic dependent nations” and 
“ward[s]” “in a state of pupilage,”136 the Supreme Court recognized 
Congress’s responsibility over the Indians in United States v. Kagama.137 
Because of “their . . . weakness and helplessness,”138 the Court 
acknowledged that Indian tribes are “dependent on the United States.”139 
From this arrangement, the United States assumed a trust relationship 
encompassing a duty of protection over the tribes, and therewith, the 
power to legislate.140 The confirmation of this power substantiated the 
congressional plenary authority over the Indian nations.141 As a result, the 
courts will “presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith” and 
“exercised its best judgment” with regard to Indian affairs.142 Moreover, 
the judiciary “cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted 
the enactment of [such] legislation.”143 This long-established power can 
seemingly be used without limitation,144 and has been recently reaffirmed 
by the Supreme Court.145 
 
134. The right is exclusive both in relation to foreign nations and the states. As the Court noted 
in Johnson v. M'Intosh, discovery granted the “sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, and 
establishing settlements upon it” at “[t]he exclusion of all other Europeans.” 21 U.S. at 573. “The 
rights thus acquired being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them.” Id. The federal 
government’s authority is also exclusive insofar as states are excluded from interfering in Indian 
affairs. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 570 (1832) (“The powers exclusively given to the 
federal government are limitations upon the state authorities.”). This idea also applies to the states. Id. 
(“But, with the exception of these limitations, the states are supreme . . . .”). 
135. “Congress shall have the power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.’” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court held 
that “the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–52 (1974)).  
136. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
137. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
138. Id. at 384. 
139. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
140. From this relationship “there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has 
always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question 
has arisen.” Id. 
141. Robert B. Porter claims that “[t]hese decisions laid the groundwork for the development of 
the ultimate doctrinal tool of American colonialism—that the United States possesses ‘[p]lenary 
authority’ over the Indian nations.” Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75, 83 (2002) (citation omitted). 
142. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 565 (holding that “[p]lenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has 
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political 
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government”). 
145.  The Supreme Court described congressional authority over Indian affairs as plenary and 
exclusive in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004), and Washington v. Confederated Bands 












Given the broad authority of Congress under the plenary power, any 
legislative act concerning Native Americans can be reworked or revoked 
at any time, including NAGPRA.146 The plenary power paradigm has 
facilitated the adoption and repeal of a variety of congressional acts. The 
General Allotment Act of 1887, designed to assimilate Native Americans 
and to “substitute white civilization for . . . tribal culture,”147 was 
supplanted by termination legislation from 1951 to 1961, intended to end 
federal supervision of tribes and discontinue special programs to tribes.148 
More recently, a plethora of congressional acts have been enacted to 
support tribes by promoting self-determination and providing federal 
benefits.149  
There is no guarantee, however, that these acts will remain in place as 
viable protections of tribal self-determination. After all, the “regime of 
‘plenary’ federal power over Indians has indeed spawned legislation 
detrimental to Indian self-determination.”150 Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that congressional action has also done much on behalf of the tribes, 
including passing NAGPRA. The lack of fixity as a result of the plenary 
doctrine, however, leaves room for the statutory protection to be stronger.  
The constant oscillation in U.S. policy toward Native Americans 
demonstrates both Congress’s broad authority and the relative instability 
 
146. Robert T. Coulter describes the range of actions permissible under the plenary power:  
Thus, we have completely unconstitutional legal rules that permit Indian land to be taken by 
the government without any compensation or other legal restraint; rules that permit Congress 
to pass practically any law it wishes regarding Indians, their governments, and their property; 
rules that permit the United States to make treaties with Indian nations and then violate the 
treaties at will without any legal liability; even a rule that Congress can put Indian tribes out 
of existence at will, at any time, for any reason, or for no reason at all. 
Coulter, supra note 12, at 541 (footnotes omitted). 
147. History of the Allotment Policy: Hearing on H.R. 7902 Before the H. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 73d Cong. 430 (1934) (statement of D. S. Otis). 
148. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151–54 (1977). 
149. For example, Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 450f–450n (2012); Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963 (2012); 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2012); National Indian Forest 
Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3120 (2012); American Indian Agricultural Resource 
Management Act of 1993, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3746 (2012); Indian Mineral Development Act, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012); Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012); Indian Tribal 
Justice Technical and Legal Assistance Act of 2000, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651–3682 (2012); Indian Tribal 
Economic Development and Contract Encouragement Act of 2000, 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2012); Native 
American Business Development, Trade Promotion, and Tourism Act of 2000, 25 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
4307 (2012); Native American Languages Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2906 (2012); Indian Alcohol and 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2401–2478 (2012); Indian Health Care 
Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1682 (2012); Indian Arts and Crafts Enforcement Act of 2000, 
25 U.S.C. §§ 305–305e (2012). 
150. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 
UCLA L. REV. 169, 176 (1991). For a discussion of the harmful legislation flowing from the plenary 
power and the vulnerability of Native American tribes to federal power, see id. at 176–80.  











of policies articulated under the plenary power. Consequently, Justice 
Thomas’s diagnosis, that “Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, 
schizophrenic,” seems entirely accurate.151 Still today, Congress can 
“regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes,” including laws governing 
cultural property.152 Native American cultural patrimony thus remains 
vulnerable to the federal plenary power. Accordingly, the current statutory 
scheme to regulate illegal trafficking in Native American cultural items 
provides only a weak protection for indigenous cultural property.153  
To best respect indigenous rights, a fixed legal framework needs to be 
implemented, free of Congress’s plenary power. Additionally, to satisfy 
the heightened commitment to indigenous rights articulated in UNDRIP, 
this law must fully respect Native American’s cultural self-determination. 
As it is currently applied, NAGPRA’s criminal provision fails these 
objectives by providing an undependable legal mechanism for protecting 
indigenous cultural patrimony that undercuts tribal cultural self-
determination in the process. Although these cases represent a “win” under 
the law, it comes at a high cost: the degradation of tribal cultural 
sovereignty. The next Part explores the best legal solution to meeting the 
goals of UNDRIP and correcting the shortcomings of NAGPRA. 
III. A TRIBAL LAW APPROACH 
Fully respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, including the right to 
cultural self-determination, requires recognizing and implementing tribal 
law.154 Unlike NAGPRA, which incentivizes and relies on non-indigenous 
parties to make judgments about Native American cultural patrimony, 
tribal law rests on decisions made by the indigenous population itself 
about what constitutes its cultural property. Initially, this solution seems 
both obvious and easy to implement: UNDRIP, after all, recognizes the 
 
151. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). He is really 
talking about the current embrace of both tribal sovereignty and the plenary power, which he considers 
antithetical interests and therefore a paradoxical stance. See id. at 217–19. 
152. Id. at 215. 
153. NAGPRA is also beset by other shortcomings that make it a potentially weak protection, 
including ownership terms, takings problems, and definitional issues. Many are discussed in 
Christopher S. Byrne, Chilkat Indian Tribe v. Johnson and NAGPRA: Have We Finally Recognized 
Communal Property Rights in Cultural Objects?, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 109, 127–31 (1993). 
154. If a top-down scheme of defining Native Americans’ own cultural heritage inevitably 
undermines the right of indigenous people to self-determination, the only satisfactory solution must 
come from the tribes themselves. Other scholars agree; even though most are thinking about 
intellectual property, the premise holds. “Finally, relying solely on top-down efforts to define 
indigenous peoples’ own cultural heritage undermines indigenous peoples’ rights to self-
determination.” Angela R. Riley, “Straight Stealing”: Towards an Indigenous System of Cultural 
Property Protection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 90 (2005) (citing Erica-Irene Daes, Intellectual Property 












superior capacity of tribal law to justly adjudicate matters related to 
indigenous culture, and the United States even has the ideological 
framework to support a robust tribal law regime. A jurisdictional hurdle, 
however, obstructs the full implementation of tribal law necessary to make 
it an effective mechanism for protecting Native American cultural objects. 
After considering the advantages of embracing a tribal law approach to 
protecting indigenous cultural patrimony, this Part will analyze the 
contours of Federal Indian Law that help and hinder the realization of the 
tribal law solution. 
Laws made from outside the tribe frustrate the free exercise of cultural 
self-determination by making decisions that should be left to indigenous 
peoples themselves.155 Exogenous judgments about cultural patrimony are 
accepted under NAGPRA, in part, because the court-conceived alternative 
is inconceivable. As the New Mexico District Court put it in Corrow: the 
court must make decisions about cultural patrimony because “it would 
seem almost impossible to provide an exhaustive list of items that would 
have ‘ongoing historical, traditional and cultural importance’ to every 
Native American tribe.”156  
Given the cultural diversity of the 566 tribal entities recognized in the 
United States, compiling such a list under NAGPRA would be 
unfeasible.157 Besides, such a statutory list would have the harmful side-
effect of freezing a tribe’s cultural patrimony in time, further undermining 
the right of indigenous peoples to “maintain, protect and develop the past, 
present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological 
and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual 
and performing arts and literature,” as UNDRIP guarantees.158 As a result, 
under NAGPRA, the court must rely on law enforcement officers, jury 
members, and even defendants to weigh the available evidence and judge 
whether an object constitutes the cultural patrimony of the Native 
American group in question.  
Conversely, a legal instrument for protecting cultural patrimony 
devised by the indigenous population itself would meet the goals of 
UNDRIP. Under a tribal law approach, each tribe could create a law 
vesting ownership of cultural patrimony in the tribe. The tribal law could 
also prohibit the trafficking in such items and even define their cultural 
patrimony based on the tribe’s unique cultural and preservation objectives. 
Such a “tribal cultural patrimony law” is perhaps the only legal 
 
155. See discussion supra Part II. 
156. United States v. Corrow, 941 F. Supp. 1553, 1564 (D.N.M. 1996).  
157. Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 80 Fed. Reg. 1942 (Jan. 14, 2015). 
158. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 11(1). 











mechanism capable of protecting Native American cultural property that 
simultaneously respects the indigenous right to self-determination. In the 
end, as the expression of the fundamental beliefs of the tribal community, 
“[o]nly tribal law can reflect the culturally specific aspects of tribal life 
and allow for differences among various indigenous groups.”159 Tribal law 
is unique because it reflects substantive legal principles inherent to the 
tribe and because it is embedded in the group’s cultural context, allowing 
for the creation of a law that respects the community’s values and 
beliefs.160  
Tribal law is also beneficially more nuanced than NAGPRA. Because 
each tribe could implement its own law, tribal law could fully enumerate 
what constitutes cultural patrimony for each tribe. Additionally, tribal law 
could be more easily updated to reflect changing community beliefs than a 
federal act. Tribes, after all, are in the best position to evaluate which 
objects have “ongoing historical, traditional or cultural importance” and to 
evaluate whether the laws designed to protect them effectively regulate 
illegal trafficking.161 Exercising tribal law also has the further benefit of 
“[e]mpowering indigenous peoples to control and direct their culture,” 
thereby “reinforc[ing] their status as independent, self-governing entities 
with political and cultural sovereignty and as stewards of their own 
destiny.”162 Embracing a tribal cultural patrimony law, therefore, would 
 
159. Riley, supra note 154, at 86. 
160. See id. at 90 (“Tribal law is drawn from a tribe's traditional customary law, tribal belief 
systems, and other contemporary forms of tribal governance, including ordinances and tribal 
constitutions. It therefore reflects not only substantive legal principles, but also the cultural context 
from which they evolved. Through tribal law, indigenous governance of cultural property and 
traditional knowledge will correlate specifically to the works tribes seek to protect, allow for forms of 
punishment consistent with the community's values, and properly incentivize behavior that is good for 
the community at large.” (citation omitted)). 
161. Id. at 123 (“Tribes themselves are in the best position to determine whether laws designed 
to protect their intangible and tangible cultural property do, in fact, work effectively within the tribal 
context. As tribal laws are tested in the community, and possibly challenged in tribal courts, tribes gain 
valuable insight into the effectiveness of those laws. As international (and perhaps domestic) law 
advances toward the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples’ rights regarding cultural 
property, tribes that have tried and tested their laws will be able to speak to the ideal regime in terms of 
substance, scope, and content. These tribes will be in the best position to contribute to a new 
overarching legal system based on their knowledge and experience rather than hope and speculation.”).  
162. Id. at 90, 120. There are more advantages, still, in Riley’s estimation:  
Either way, a tribe will be well-served if it achieves consensus on its tribal law prior to the 
emergence of a dispute. This way, a tribe can come together as a community to determine the 
appropriate treatment of its most valuable resources before infringement occurs. This process 
could serve to unify tribal members and provide an opportunity for elders to share with others 
the historical and spiritual significance of the tribe’s cultural property. In addition, defined 
laws have the benefit of putting others—both members and nonmembers—on notice of 
applicable restrictions on the use of the tribe's cultural property. 












satisfy the self-determination and cultural protection goals outlined in 
UNDRIP. 
Article 11 of UNDRIP makes this point clear: “States shall provide 
redress through effective mechanisms . . . with respect to [indigenous 
peoples’] cultural . . . property taken . . . in violation of their laws, 
traditions and customs.”163 UNDRIP thus obligates signatory States to 
respect indigenous cultural patrimony laws.  
At the outset, meeting this goal seems easy because the United States 
already has a jurisprudential framework that recognizes tribal law. Native 
American tribes retain all the attributes of sovereignty except for those 
governmental powers removed by treaty, federal statute, or by virtue of 
inconsistency with the tribes’ dependent status.164 Part of this inherent 
sovereignty is “[t]he ability to define what constitutes ‘property’ and the 
ability to draw the boundaries between private and public . . . property.”165 
Accordingly, based on their retained inherent sovereignty, Native 
Americans have a recognized right to create their own property laws 
because this attribute of sovereignty has not been withdrawn.166 Tribal 
laws may vest property interests in the tribe, allowing for the creation and 
enumeration of cultural patrimony, and may also criminalize trafficking in 
cultural patrimony.167 In short, Federal Indian law allows for the creation 
of tribal cultural patrimony laws, the ideal legal instrument to fulfill the 
United States’ new policy goals. 
Embracing a tribal law approach that reflects indigenous peoples’ own 
dynamic sense of their own law has other advantages as well. Deferring to 
tribal law builds the legitimacy of both tribal and U.S. law.168 Although 
each tribal law represents a unique answer to the needs of the particular 
community to devise its own laws based on its own values and traditions, 
 
163. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 11(2). 
164. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Indian tribes still possess those 
aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of 
their dependent status.”). That is, their status as “domestic dependent nations.” Struve, supra note 132, 
at 934. 
165. Patty Gerstenblith, United States v. Schultz, CULTURE WITHOUT CONTEXT, Spring 2002, at 
27, 30 [hereinafter Gerstenblith, United States v. Schultz]. 
166. See, e.g., FRED A. SEATON & ELMER F. BENNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF 
THE SOLICITOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 395 (2008) (explaining that Indian self-government includes 
the power of an Indian tribe “to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the tribe”). As an internal 
affair, property regulations do not conflict with dependent status. See id.  
167. And there is no reason why the tribe, as a sovereign, cannot vest the property interest in 
itself as the state. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850) (“Every sovereign State is of 
necessity a body politic, or artificial person, and as such capable of making contracts and holding 
property, both real and personal. . . . [A]s a corporation or body politic [the United States] may bring 
suits to enforce their contracts and protect their property, in the State courts, or in their own tribunals 
administering the same laws.”). 
168. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. 
REV. 225, 237–44 (1994).  











the Navajo well exemplify the importance of encouraging the development 
of tribal law. Today, the Navajo Nation court system hears more than 
50,000 cases per year169 and has developed a line of precedent constituting 
a rich common law of the tribe, such that “Navajos see their common law 
as the base upon which their society functions.”170 The Supreme Court of 
the Navajo Nation made this clear in the 1989 decision In re Validation of 
Marriage of Francisco, asserting that  
[t]he Navajo Nation must control and develop its own legal system 
because “the concept of justice has its source in the fabric of each 
individual society. The concept of justice, what it means for any 
group of people, cannot be separated from the total beliefs, ideas, 
and customs of that group of people.”171  
Moreover, the court declared that the Nation must “regulate all domestic 
relations within its jurisdiction if sovereignty has any meaning.”172 
Encouraging the development of tribal law thus fosters the self-
determination and jurisprudential legitimacy of tribes. 
Applying tribal law to matters related to Native Americans similarly 
legitimizes U.S. law. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Supreme 
Court recognized tribal courts as appropriate forums for adjudicating 
“disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both 
Indians and non-Indians.”173 The Supreme Court even nurtured Native 
Americans’ sovereign interest in self-government in Williams v. Lee, 
holding that the extension of state jurisdiction over tribes “would infringe 
on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”174 This interest arises 
from recognition that tribes retain the right to self-government within the 
United States legal system and that any intrusion on this right denigrates 
both tribal sovereignty and the legitimacy of U.S. law.175 The United 
States, therefore, already has in place a stable framework for reconciling 
Native American self-determination and U.S. law. 
 
169. Courts & Peacemaking in the Navajo Nation: A Public Guide, NAVAJO COURTS (Jan. 30, 
2018), http://www.navajocourts.org/publicguide.htm [https://perma.cc/327K-T3CY].   
170. Raymond D. Austin, Freedom, Responsibility, and Duty: ADR and the Navajo Peacemaker 
Court, JUDGES J., Spring 1993, at 8, 11. 
171. 6 Navajo Rptr. 134 (Navajo 1989) (quoting T. TSO, CHIEF JUSTICE’S ANNUAL REPORT 
(1988)), reprinted in MATTHEW L. M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 440 (2011). 
172. Id.  
173. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65–66 (1978) (citing Fisher v. District Court, 
424 U.S. 382 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 
(1883)). 
174. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
175. See Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II–VII, §§ 201–701, 82 Stat. 
77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1341 (2012)) (recognizing that Indian tribes retain 












Although Native American tribes have a recognized right to create laws 
regulating their cultural patrimony, and applying tribal law would have 
several advantages, effectually enforcing such laws would be problematic. 
To have impact, the criminal trafficking provisions of tribal cultural 
patrimony laws would need to be broadly applied to cover all looters, but 
these laws would have limited reach.176 Although tribes may exercise civil 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,177 tribal criminal 
jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed.178 As part of their inherent 
sovereignty, tribes have criminal jurisdiction over their members,179 and 
Congress ensured that a tribe’s power of self-government also includes 
“the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over all Indians,” covering both members and non-member Indians.180 
Tribes’ criminal jurisdiction, however, does not extend over non-Indians. 
The Supreme Court held in Oliphant v. Suquamish that “Indian tribes do 
 
176. As Kuruk notes, tribes’ jurisdiction is continuously scrutinized by the courts, especially in 
cases involving non-Indians. Paul Kuruk, Goading a Reluctant Dinosaur: Mutual Recognition 
Agreements as a Policy Response to the Misappropriation of Foreign Traditional Knowledge in the 
United States, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 629, 645 (2007). Newton conceptualizes tribal court jurisprudence as 
taking “place against a field of potential federal court interference.” Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and 
Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995). In this view, 
tribal jurisdiction is balanced between tribal sovereignty, the preservation of tribal cultures, and a 
concern for individual rights. See id. 
177. In Montana v. United States, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]o be sure, Indian tribes 
retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their 
reservations.” 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). The Court clarified that, specifically, “[a] tribe may regulate, 
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other 
arrangements.” Id. at 565–66 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 223; Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 
(1904); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152–54 (1980)). And that “tribe[s] may also retain inherent 
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation 
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, 
or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Id. at 566 (citing Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); 
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220; Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128–29 
(1906); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 273 (1898)). 
178. For a recent discussion of the history of tribal criminal law jurisdiction, see Struve, supra 
note 132, at 935–44 (outlining the relevant Supreme Court decisions (in 1978 and 1990) limiting 
tribes’ criminal jurisdiction and the congressional response).  
179. In 1978, the Supreme Court declared that “[i]t is undisputed that Indian tribes have power 
to enforce their criminal laws against tribe members.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 
(1978). Because tribes “have a significant interest in maintaining orderly relations among their 
members and in preserving tribal customs and traditions,” and because “[t]ribal laws and procedures 
are often influenced by tribal custom and can differ greatly from our own,” the Court recognized that 
“tribal courts are important mechanisms for protecting significant tribal interests.” Id. at 331–32. 
180. Following a congressional amendment, the Indian Civil Rights Act defines as part of a 
tribe’s power of self-government “the inherent power . . . to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2012) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 
1892 (1990)). This was passed in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676, 679 (1990) (holding that Indian tribes could not prosecute non-member Indians for committing 
crimes on their reservations). For a more complete history, see generally id. at 684–88. 











not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians,”181 because 
such jurisdiction is inconsistent with the tribes’ status under federal law 
and threatens the liberty interests of non-Indian defendants.182 
Accordingly, criminally punishing traffickers, most of whom are non-
Indian, under tribal cultural patrimony laws would be impossible, making 
the protection largely ineffective.  
There are, however, ways around the jurisdictional hurdle. An 
affirmative delegation by Congress could grant Native Americans criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.183 This would make tribal law an effective 
mechanism for protecting Native Americans’ cultural patrimony. Yet, 
even if such jurisdiction over non-Indians who trafficked in tribal cultural 
patrimony were granted, the accompanying criminal sentences would be 
disproportionately minimal and potentially ineffective.184 Originally, the 
Indian Civil Rights Act limited criminal sentences issued from tribal 
courts to a maximum of six months.185 Although the maximum sentence 
was recently raised to three years, a $15,000 fine, or both, by the Tribal 
Law and Order Act of 2010,186 the punishment imposed under tribal law 
would still be less than the penalties under NAGPRA.187 Furthermore, a 
congressional delegation of criminal jurisdiction would be subject to the 
same destabilizing plenary power as NAGPRA, ultimately yielding an 
unreliable protection. Tribal cultural patrimony laws vesting ownership in 
the tribe and prohibiting trafficking in tribal items are consequently too 
limited to effectively safeguard Native American cultural objects.  
The legal instrument that best satisfies the goals of UNDRIP, therefore, 
seems impracticable. Perhaps fairly, scholars have been skeptical about the 
 
181. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
182. Id. at 210 (“The power of the United States to try and criminally punish is an important 
manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting to the overriding sovereignty of 
the United States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens of 
the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress.”). 
183. See id. at 208 (“Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent 
affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”). 
184. Depending on the prison sentence and fine, the punishment could be so minimal as to be 
ineffective, as was the case with the Antiquities Act of 1906, under which it was a crime to 
“appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of 
antiquity” on federal land without a permit. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2012). A violation now entails a fine of 
up to $5,000 and/or a prison sentence of up to six months. HUTT ET AL., supra note 49, at 183. 
Historically, the Act failed to sufficiently protect cultural property because of inadequate penalties that 
did not deter looters. See Thomas H. Boyd, Disputes Regarding the Possession of Native American 
Religious and Cultural Objects and Human Remains: A Discussion of the Applicable Law and 
Proposed Legislation, 55 MO. L. REV. 883, 893–94 (1990). 
185. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 202, 82 Stat. 73, 77 (imposing a 
maximum punishment for any one offense to “a term of six months or a fine of $500, or both”).  
186. Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2279, 2279–80 (2010). 
187. NAGPRA, for comparison, stipulates fines up to $100,000 and twelve months 
imprisonment for first offenses and fines up to $250,000 and five years imprisonment for subsequent 












“utility of developing tribal laws to protect cultural property if those laws 
will be unenforceable.”188 To meet America’s new policy goals, 
lawmakers must seemingly do the impossible: devise an indigenous 
cultural patrimony protection law that both respects the right to cultural 
self-determination and can be effectually applied to all looters of Native 
American cultural objects, Indians and non-Indians alike. This challenge 
might be called the “indigenous cultural patrimony problem.” The 
following Part proposes a solution by looking to the U.S. response to the 
so-called cultural property wars.  
IV. THE MCCLAIN DOCTRINE 
By turning to the current legal mechanism governing the flow of 
foreign cultural property into the United States, this Part identifies a 
solution to the indigenous cultural patrimony problem.189 After briefly 
discussing the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA),190 this Part focuses 
on its application to foreign cultural patrimony cases, known as the 
McClain doctrine. Next, this Part proposes applying the same legal 
framework employed in the McClain doctrine to domestic indigenous 
cultural property. This approach facilitates the broad recognition of tribal 
cultural patrimony laws, thereby allowing Native Americans to exercise 
cultural self-determination while effecting a viable legal instrument to 
protect Native American cultural objects.  
A. The National Stolen Property Act 
Although it was originally intended as a tool to prosecute automobile 
thieves, the NSPA has become the “principal legal instrument for 
 
188. As Riley observes, supra note 154, at 118 (citing Gerard Bodeker, Traditional Medical 
Knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights & Benefit Sharing, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 785, 
787 (2003)). Riley, herself, also remarks that “[e]xpecting the world to recognize and abide by tribal 
law may seem idealistic.” Id. at 123. To an extent, such skepticism is unfounded; after all, ICWA, 
among other statutes, successfully enforces tribal law to protect and maintain Native American culture. 
See supra note 149. The more difficult concern is whether a law can effectively protect Native 
American cultural patrimony while simultaneously respecting the right of indigenous peoples to 
exercise cultural self-determination.  
189. See Andrew L. Adler & Stephen K. Urice, Resolving the Disjunction Between Cultural 
Property Policy and Law: A Call for Reform, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 117, 118 (2011). According to 
Adler and Urice, both the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15 (2012) and the 
Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13 (2012) make up “[t]he 
current legal framework governing the movement of cultural property into the United States.” Id. This 
article only considers the NSPA. 
190. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15. 











restricting the movement of cultural property into the United States.”191 
The NSPA prohibits the transportation, transmission, or transfer of goods 
worth $5,000 or more across borders in interstate or foreign commerce, 
knowing the goods to have been stolen.192 Additionally, the statute 
criminalizes the knowing receipt, possession, concealment, storage, barter, 
sale, or disposition of such goods across a state or United States 
boundary.193 A first offense under the NSPA can be punished with a fine 
and a prison sentence up to ten years.194  
By recognizing foreign property legislation, the NSPA allows foreign 
cultural patrimony laws to be effectively enforced within the United 
States.195 Similar to the objectives under NAGPRA, this application of the 
NSPA endeavors to undercut the networks that unlawfully supply cultural 
objects to the market by imprisoning dealers in the United States who 
trade in illegally imported artifacts.196 Due to its application to goods that 
are “stolen,” a term that remains undefined in the statute, the NSPA is 
ambiguous and its implementation in cultural property cases is 
complicated.197  
The NSPA is applied to cultural objects in two types of cases. In the 
first, objects are brought into the United States after being stolen from a 
known possessor with an undisputed title. In these cases, the application of 
the NSPA is uncontroversial.198 The second application covers property 
that is stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law. Many of these laws 
rely on a theory of constructive possession to claim state ownership of 
cultural objects; under this theory, even if objects were never in the actual 
possession of anyone until they were looted and sold by thieves, the state 
 
191. Adler & Urice, supra note 189, at 119. For a discussion of the origin of the NSPA, see 
Stephen K. Urice, Between Rocks and Hard Places: Unprovenanced Antiquities and the National 
Stolen Property Act, 40 N.M. L. REV. 123, 133–34 (2010). 
192. 18 U.S.C. § 2314. 
193. Id. § 2315. 
194. Id.  
195. Mark J. Petr, Note, Trading Places: Illicit Antiquities, Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws, 
and the U.S. National Stolen Property Act after United States v. Schultz, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 503, 505 (2005). 
196. Id. at 507 (“It is hoped by NSPA prosecution proponents that imprisoning dealers in the 
United States who trade in illegally imported artifacts will eventually undercut the networks that 
supply such objects to the trade.”). Green similarly notes that “[b]y supporting nations' efforts to retain 
archaeological works, the NSPA promotes the preservation of artifacts, especially monumental and 
site-specific works.” Green, supra note 4, at 257. 
197. Petr documents at least three factors related to cultural patrimony that complicate NSPA 
prosecutions: (1) that excavation and trade practices, and the age of many cultural objects, make it 
nearly impossible for even legitimate dealers to be sure of an object’s provenance, and it is relatively 
easy to fabricate a believable provenance; (2) traditional business practices in the art trade rely on 
informal agreements; and (3) personnel and budget constraints make it difficult to thoroughly research 
every piece for sale on the art market. Petr, supra note 195, at 507. 
198. Adam Goldberg, Comment, Reaffirming McClain: The National Stolen Property Act and 












can still claim ownership.199 Litigating these trafficking claims under the 
NSPA has been contentious. In these cases, the debate centers on whether 
a foreign nation’s patrimony law or vesting statute renders the objects 
“stolen” for the purposes of the NSPA. To date, only three federal 
appellate courts have considered the issue.200 To better understand the 
NSPA’s application to the unique issues surrounding cultural patrimony, 
this Part will next analyze each case to identify the principles underlying 
the McClain doctrine.  
B. Cultural Property Case Law and the McClain Doctrine 
1. Hollinshead 
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit was the first federal appeals court to consider 
the application of the NSPA to property obtained in contravention of a 
foreign patrimony law in United States v. Hollinshead.201 Hollinshead, a 
dealer in pre-Columbian artifacts, arranged for the shipment of several 
cultural objects in Central America, including a pre-Columbian stele found 
in a Mayan ruin in the Guatemalan jungle.202 After sawing the stele into 
pieces and importing them into the United States, Hollinshead was 
convicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314 for conspiracy to transport stolen 
property in interstate and foreign commerce.203 Under the NSPA, the stele 
was deemed “stolen” because Guatemalan law declared that “all such 
artifacts are the property of the Republic, and may not be removed without 
permission of the government.”204 At trial, the district court received 
expert testimony regarding the application of Guatemalan law to pre-
Columbia artifacts, such as the stele.205  
In Hollinshead, the defendant did not challenge the application of the 
NSPA to Guatemalan patrimony law, but appealed on the grounds that the 
jury was erroneously instructed.206 The court affirmed Hollinshead’s 
 
199. Patty Gerstenblith, The Public Interest in the Restitution of Cultural Objects, 16 CONN. J. 
INT'L L. 197, 228–29 (2001) [hereinafter Gerstenblith, Public Interest].  
200. Adler & Urice, supra note 189, at 126. As Adler & Urice note, the issue has been 
considered by two federal district courts in civil forfeiture cases. Id. at 126 n.44; see also United States 
v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 991 F. Supp. 222, 231–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that an Italian 
patrimony law vested ownership in the disputed object such that it could be considered stolen under 
the NSPA), aff’d on other grounds, 184 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Pre-Columbian 
Artifacts, 845 F. Supp. 544, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (holding the same regarding a Guatemalan cultural 
patrimony law).  
201. 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). 




206. Id. (“Appellants’ one arguable contention is that the court erroneously instructed the jury 
that there is a presumption that every person knows what the law forbids. . . . They point to the fact 











conviction with little analysis, devoting scant attention to the issue of 
national ownership.207 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit’s acceptance of the 
prosecution’s theory has proven significant. By maintaining that an object 
is “stolen” as defined by the NSPA if it is obtained in violation of a 
foreign patrimony law, the court in Hollinshead laid the foundation for the 
application of the NSPA in future cultural property cases.208  
2. McClain 
Three years later, the Fifth Circuit heard United States v. McClain in 
1977 (McClain I).209 The McClain defendants had attempted to sell 
various pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported from Mexico to an 
undercover FBI agent.210 Subsequently convicted of conspiring to 
transport and receive through interstate commerce artifacts known to have 
been stolen in violation of the NSPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314, 2315, the 
defendants appealed on two grounds. First, they argued that the word 
“stolen” under the NSPA only covers the wrongful deprivation of 
ownership rights as understood at common law, namely, physical 
possession.211 The defendants maintained that they had simply committed 
a case of “mere illegal exportation” and not theft because Mexico never 
alleged the deprivation of the property and because the “Mexican 
legislative declarations of ‘ownership’ of pre-Columbia artifacts are . . . 
not enough to bring the objects within the protection of the NSPA.”212 
Additionally, the defendants challenged the trial court’s finding that the 
Mexican law had vested ownership of all pre-Columbian artifacts in the 
Republic at the time of the disputed objects’ removal from Mexico.213 
 
that it is the law of Guatemala that characterizes the stele as stolen property, and that there is no 
presumption that they knew Guatemalan law. Essentially their claim is that the instruction was 
overbroad and that it should have been supplemented with or limited by an instruction requested by 
appellants which made it clear that there is no such presumption as to knowledge of foreign law.” 
(citation omitted)). 
207. Id. at 1156. 
208. Id. 
209. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977). 
210. Id. at 992 (including “terra cotta figures and pottery, beads, and a few stucco pieces”). As 
the court notes in McClain I, “[t]hese articles had not been registered with the Public Register of 
Archaeological and Historical Zones and Monuments of the Republic of Mexico, or with any 
government register, and were exported without a license or a permit from Mexico into the United 
States.” Id. 
211. Id. at 994 (“They argue that the word ‘stolen’ cannot include the pre-Columbian artifacts 
seized in this case, for there was no evidence showing that the artifacts had been taken without consent 
from private individuals or that the artifacts had been in the possession of the Republic of Mexico.”). 
212. Id. 
213. Id. (“Second, the appellants contend that, even if a legislative declaration of ownership 
would, with export restrictions, invoke the protection of the NSPA, the trial court erred in instructing 












After finding that the term “stolen” should be broadly interpreted under 
the NSPA,214 the McClain I court considered the defendant’s second 
challenge. For an exported object to be considered “stolen” within the 
meaning of the NSPA, the court held that “a declaration of national 
ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can be 
considered theft.”215 Accordingly, the court performed a detailed analysis 
of the Mexican patrimony law in question, including its language, intent, 
and history, to determine when ownership of pre-Columbian artifacts were 
vested in the Republic of Mexico.  
Based on the testimony of Dr. Alejandro Gertz, a deputy attorney 
general of Mexico who “had been instrumental in revising Mexican laws 
dealing with protection of the Mexican cultural heritage,”216 the trial court 
determined, since 1897, Mexican law declared pre-Columbian artifacts 
discovered within Mexico to be the property of the Republic.217 Finding 
this conclusion erroneous, the appellate court noted that although 
“Mexican law has been concerned with the preservation and regulation of 
pre-Columbian artifacts since 1897 . . . ownership of all pre-Columbian 
objects by legislative fiat, did not come until much later.”218 Beginning 
with the 1897 Mexican Law on Archaeological Monuments,219 the court in 
McClain I scrutinized the evolution of Mexico’s cultural patrimony laws 
pertaining to pre-Columbian artifacts. In total, the court meticulously 
studied the application and intent of five different statutes relating to 
cultural property, even analyzing the relevant statutory language in both 
 
214. Id. Summarizing its decision in McClain I and its interpretation of the term “stolen,” the 
Fifth Circuit explained that: 
This conclusion is a result of our attempt to reconcile the doctrine of strict construction of 
criminal statutes with the broad significance attached to the word “stolen” in the NSPA. Were 
the word to be so narrowly construed as to exclude coverage, for example, with respect to 
pre-Columbian artifacts illegally exported from Mexico after the effective date of the 1972 
law, the Mexican government would be denied protection of the Act after it had done all it 
reasonably could do—vested itself with ownership—to protect its interest in the artifacts. 
This would violate the apparent objective of Congress: the protection of owners of stolen 
property. If, on the other hand, an object were considered “stolen” merely because it was 
illegally exported, the meaning of the term “stolen” would be stretched beyond its 
conventional meaning. Although “stealing” is not a term of art, it is also not a word bereft of 
meaning. It should not be expanded at the government's will beyond the connotation—
depriving an owner of its rights in property—conventionally called to mind. 
Id. at 1001–02 (footnote omitted).  
215. Id. at 1000. 
216. Id. at 993. 
217. Id. at 994 (noting exceptions for cases “where the Government of the Republic of Mexico 
has, by way of license or permit, granted permission to private persons or parties or others to receive 
and export in their possession such artifacts to other places or other countries”). 
218. Id. at 997. 
219. Ley Sobre Monumentos Arqueológicos, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-5-1897. 











Spanish and English.220 Based on this review, the Fifth Circuit 
differentiated export restrictions from cultural patrimony laws vesting 
ownership in the state,221 ultimately concluding that the Mexican 
government declared that all pre-Columbian artifacts were owned by the 
Republic only in 1972.222 
Because the date the McClain artifacts had been removed from Mexico 
and brought into the United States had not been precisely determined by 
the trial court, the convictions were overturned and remanded.223 After 
being convicted again on remand in United States v. McClain (McClain 
II),224 the defendants appealed on grounds nearly identical to those raised 
in McClain I.225 This time, the Fifth Circuit found that NSPA claims based 
on vague vesting statutes raised due process concerns.226 Consequently, 
the court held that property claimed by cultural patrimony laws cannot be 
considered “stolen”—as defined by the NSPA—unless the ownership 
declaration is sufficiently clear for U.S. citizens to understand.227 In the 
end, the defendants were acquitted on the substantive counts because it 
was uncertain whether the objects they were selling had been removed 
before or after 1972; however, because the record indicated that the 
defendants intended to continue trading in illicit Mexican cultural objects, 
the court upheld the conspiracy conviction.228 
 
220. After considering the 1897 law, the court analyzed the Law on the Protection and 
Conservation of Monuments and Natural Beauty, Ley Sobre Protección y Conservación de 
Monumentos y Bellezas Naturales, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 31-01-1920, the Law for the 
Protection and Preservation of Archaeological and Historic Monuments, Typical Towns and Places of 
Scenic Beauty, Ley Sobre Protección y Conservación de Monumentos Arqueológicos e Históricos, 
Poblaciones Típicas y Lugares de Belleza Natural, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 19-01-1934,, 
the Federal Law Concerning Cultural Patrimony of the Nation, Ley Federal del Patrimonio Cultural de 
la Nación, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 16-12-1970, and the Federal Law on Archaeological, 
Artistic and Historic Monuments and Zones, Ley Federal Sobre Monumentos y Zonas Arqueológicos, 
Artísticos e Históricos [LMZAA], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 06-05-1972. McClain I, 545 
F.2d at 997–1000 (“This review of the relevant Mexican statutes demonstrates that the Mexican 
government has, since 1897, been staking out for itself greater and greater rights in pre-Columbian 
artifacts. Only in 1972, however, did the government declare that all pre-Columbian artifacts were 
owned by the Republic.”). 
221. McClain I. 545 F.2d at 1002–03 (“Exportation restrictions guard that jurisdiction and 
power. But, except for this effect on jurisdiction, restrictions on exportation are just like any other 
police power restrictions. They do not create ‘ownership’ in the state. The state comes to own property 
only when it acquires such property in the general manner by which private persons come to own 
property, or when it declares itself the owner; the declaration is an attribute of sovereignty.”). 
222. Id. at 1000. 
223. Id. at 1003–04. 
224. 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979). 
225. See Gerstenblith, Public Interest, supra note 199, at 216. 
226. McClain II, 593 F.2d at 665–66. 
227. Id. at 670 (“And under this view of Mexican law, we believe the defendants may have 
suffered the prejudice of being convicted pursuant to laws that were too vague to be a predicate for 
criminal liability under our jurisprudential standards.”). 
228. After the sale for which they were originally arrested, in clear violation of the 1972 












Although the court did not sustain all of the convictions, the McClain 
decisions are significant for establishing the legal framework that has 
become the principal instrument for restricting the movement of cultural 
objects into the United States.229 In McClain, the Fifth Circuit defined 
central principles concerning foreign patrimony laws and adumbrated the 
limitations of imposing criminal liability under the NSPA based on such 
laws.230 These principles establish what is known today as the McClain 
doctrine.231 Broadly, the McClain doctrine establishes the theory that 
“legislation may vest ownership of [cultural objects] in the national 
government, regardless of . . . actual possession,” and that these ownership 
laws are recognizable by the United States.232 To better understand the 
possibilities afforded by this jurisprudential framework, however, it is 
worth looking at the principles underlying the McClain doctrine in greater 
detail.  
By recognizing national ownership declarations as an attribute of 
sovereignty, the McClain I court found no legal distinction between 
property owned by a private person holding it in physical possession and 
property owned by a nation based on a theory of constructive 
possession.233 Unlawfully removing an object from a foreign country with 
a cultural patrimony law, however, does not automatically result in a 
violation of the NSPA. Convictions under the NSPA require a scienter 
element, such that the defendant knows the “objects are claimed by a 
foreign state before they can be considered stolen.”234  
The McClain decisions thus delineate three requirements for the 
doctrine to apply. First, to be recognized in U.S. courts, the foreign 
cultural patrimony laws must be more than export restrictions and must 
clearly and unambiguously establish national ownership. Second, because 
national vesting statutes are not given extraterritorial effect, to be 
 
229. Adler & Urice, supra note 189, at 119 (“Despite the fact that the NSPA was never intended 
to address the unique issues surrounding cultural property, the Fifth Circuit’s seminal McClain 
decisions in the late 1970s . . . effectively transformed the statute into the Executive’s principal legal 
instrument for restricting the movement of cultural property into the United States.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
230. The limitations would be more fully delineated by the court in United States v. Schultz, 
discussed infra Part IV.B.3.  
231. Andrea Cunning, U.S. Policy on the Enforcement of Foreign Export Restrictions on 
Cultural Property & Destructive Aspects of Retention Schemes, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 449, 486 (2004) 
(explaining that the McClain decision “has given rise to what is known as the ‘McClain Doctrine’”). 
232. Gerstenblith, Public Interest, supra note 199, at 216 (highlighting this as the primary 
principle established by the McClain cases).  
233. United States v. McClain (McClain I), 545 F.2d 988, 1002–03 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The state 
comes to own property only when it acquires such property in the general manner by which private 
persons come to own property, or when it declares itself the owner; the declaration is an attribute of 
sovereignty.”). 
234. Goldberg, supra note 198, at 1042. 











considered stolen under the NSPA, cultural objects must have been found 
within the modern borders of the nation claiming ownership. Finally, the 
unlawful removal of the object must have occurred after the effective date 
of the patrimony legislation.  
Notably, the courts in McClain never questioned whether the objects at 
issue constituted cultural patrimony, that is, whether the objects had 
ongoing historical, traditional, or cultural importance central to Mexico. 
The decision about what constitutes protected cultural objects was left to 
Mexico alone. Instead, the court inquired only into the history of the 
cultural patrimony law to determine its validity and date of application.  
3. Schultz 
The third case that applied this framework in a federal appellate court 
was United States v. Schultz.235 A successful art dealer in New York City, 
Schultz was indicted in 2001 for conspiring to receive stolen Egyptian 
antiquities transported in interstate and foreign commerce between 1991 
and 1996 in violation of the NSPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2315.236 The items 
included “a stone sculptural head of the 18th Dynasty pharaoh Amenhotep 
III, a faience figure of a king kneeling at an altar, a pair of wall reliefs 
from the tomb of Hetepka in Saqqara, and a 6th Dynasty statue of a 
striding figure.”237 Like McClain, the case centered on a cultural 
patrimony law, this time, Egypt’s 1983 Law on the Protection of 
Antiquities (“Law 117”).238 By vesting ownership of all antiquities in the 
national government, Law 117 renders all antiquities excavated and 
removed without permission after the law’s enactment stolen property 
under Egyptian law.239  
Initially, Schultz moved to have the indictment dismissed, attacking the 
validity of the McClain doctrine.240 Schultz’s argument was threefold: (1) 
that Law 117 was an export control and not an ownership law; (2) that 
objects taken in violation of foreign ownership laws are not considered 
stolen property under the NSPA; and (3) that the McClain doctrine was 
 
235. 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003). As Gerstenblith notes, until shortly before his indictment, 
Schultz was the president of the National Association of Dealers in Ancient, Oriental and Primitive Art 
and one of the “most prominent and respected dealers” in the trade. Gerstenblith, United States v. 
Schultz, supra note 165, at 27. 
236. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 395.  
237. Patty Gerstenblith, The McClain/Schultz Doctrine: Another Step Against Trade in Stolen 
Antiquities, CULTURE WITHOUT CONTEXT, Autumn 2003, at 5, 5. 
238. Law No. 117 of 1983 (Law on the Protection of Antiquities), al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyah, vol. 
32 bis, 11 Aug. 1983 (Egypt) [hereinafter Law No. 117]. 
239. Id. art. 6–8. 












preempted by the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
(CPIA).241  
Turning to the plain language of Law 117, the district court held that 
the Egyptian law “vests with the state most, and perhaps all, the rights 
ordinarily associated with ownership of property, including title, 
possession, and right to transfer,” and concluded that the law “is far more 
than a licensing scheme or export regulation.”242 In defense of his first 
contention, Schultz offered the testimony of Abou El Fadl, a professor of 
law, who argued that Law 117 does not prevent an antiquity discovered in 
Egypt after 1983 from remaining in private hands.243 In response, the 
government presented Dr. Gaballa Ali Gaballa, Secretary General to the 
Supreme Council of Antiquities, and General Ali Sobky, Director of 
Criminal Investigations for the Antiquities Police, who testified that Egypt 
takes immediate custody of newly discovered antiquities and that violators 
are punished under Law 117.244 Based on this evidence, the court held that 
Law 117 effectively transfers ownership of Egyptian antiquities to the 
state.245 
After dismissing the defendant’s first argument, the court next 
considered whether American law recognizes “the kind of ‘special’ 
property interest created by ‘patrimony’ laws like Law 117.”246 
Analogizing to the hypothetical prosecution of an American who 
conspired to steal the Liberty Bell under the NSPA, the court asked, 
“[W]hy should it make any difference that a foreign nation, in order to 
safeguard its precious cultural heritage, has chosen to assume ownership 
of those objects in its domain that have historical or archeological 
importance, rather than leaving them in private hands?”247 Recognizing in 
both instances an implicit government interest to deter residents from 
dealing in unlawfully obtained items, the court reaffirmed the notion that 
the NSPA can be applied to thefts in foreign countries, including thefts 
based on cultural patrimony laws.248  
Lastly, noting that § 2315 of the NSPA is applied only “in cases of 
intentional theft and knowing disposal of stolen goods,” the court 
distinguished the CPIA and found that there is no conflict that would bar 
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prosecution under the McClain doctrine.249 Thus upholding the McClain 
doctrine, the trial court dismissed the motion and convicted Schultz of 
conspiracy to violate the NSPA, levying a $50,000 fine and imposing a 
33-month prison sentence.250  
Although Schultz raised several issues on appeal, only two are 
significant for the present discussion of the McClain doctrine. Primarily, 
Schultz argued that the antiquities he allegedly conspired to receive were 
not owned by anyone, and therefore could not be considered stolen.251 
Schultz contended that even if Egyptian law deemed cultural objects 
government property, they should not be considered owned by Egypt for 
the purposes of U.S. law and the enforcement of the NSPA.252 
In response to Schultz’s arguments, the Second Circuit first analyzed 
Law 117 to determine whether it was a valid ownership law. Clarifying its 
own methodology, the court asserted that it is “capable of evaluating 
foreign patrimony laws to determine whether their language and 
enforcement indicate that they are intended to assert true ownership of 
certain property, or merely to restrict the export of that property.”253 Law 
117 provides that all Egyptian antiquities are property of the state, where 
antiquities are defined as “objects over a century old having archaeological 
or historical importance.”254 In pertinent part, the statute straightforwardly 
declares that “[a]ll antiquities are considered to be public property.”255 
Notably, the court limited itself to an analysis of the law and its 
application. Weighing the testimony of the Egyptian officials,256 the plain 
language of the law, and Schultz’s failure to present evidence refuting that 
Law 117 “is not what its plain language indicates,” the court held that the 
Egyptian law is a “clear and unambiguous” ownership law.257  
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To dismiss Schultz’s contention that the antiquities were not stolen 
within the meaning of the NSPA because they were never truly owned by 
the Egyptian government, the court turned to McClain.258 Citing Supreme 
Court precedent that the NSPA “should be broadly construed,” the Second 
Circuit held that the application of the NSPA is broad enough to cover 
goods stolen in foreign countries.259 Correspondingly, receipt of antiquities 
stolen in Egypt and then shipped to the United States amounts to a 
violation of the NSPA. Additionally, the court determined that “the fact 
that the rightful owner of the stolen property is foreign has no impact on a 
prosecution under the NSPA.”260 Upholding the McClain doctrine, the 
Second Circuit clearly explained that “the NSPA applies to property that is 
stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law.”261  
Two important principles emerge from the Second Circuit’s reasoning. 
First, that the application of the NSPA to cultural patrimony cases entails 
the evaluation of the disputed foreign patrimony law to ensure that it 
asserts true ownership. Importantly, this inquiry does not require the 
corollary evaluation of the historical or cultural importance of the 
contested object to the country from which it was taken. Second, Schultz 
reaffirms the theory that the NSPA can be broadly applied to cover theft 
under both American and international property laws, underscoring the 
notion that the identity of the rightful owner of the stolen property is 
inconsequential. 
V. THE INDIGENOUS MCCLAIN DOCTRINE: SOLVING THE INDIGENOUS 
CULTURAL PATRIMONY PROBLEM 
Although the McClain doctrine was developed in response to foreign 
laws, its domestic application offers a practicable solution to the 
indigenous cultural patrimony problem. To meet the new standards set by 
UNDRIP, the United States must devise effective legal protections for 
Native American cultural objects that simultaneously respect the right of 
indigenous peoples to freely exercise self-determination. Because 
NAGPRA compels courts to make judgments about indigenous cultural 
patrimony, the current U.S. framework fails to satisfy the goals outlined 
by the UN Declaration regarding self-determination. Tribal cultural 
patrimony laws represent the only legal scheme that fully respects this 
right. In the United States, however, tribal criminal jurisdiction cannot be 
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exercised over non-Indians. As a result, tribal law would not effectively 
safeguard indigenous cultural property, thereby failing UNDRIP’s 
protection goals. The best option for meeting both objectives is the 
imposition of criminal sanctions on all violators of tribal cultural 
patrimony laws, a seeming impossibility. 
Applying the legal framework established by the McClain doctrine, 
however, offers a solution to the indigenous cultural patrimony problem. 
This Part will explore how this framework can be mapped onto domestic 
cultural patrimony cases. Considering the principles undergirding the 
McClain doctrine, this Part will show that the same principles that apply to 
foreign cultural objects should also apply to Native American cultural 
patrimony. Finally, this Part will highlight the advantages of applying the 
McClain doctrine to tribal law and discuss potential disadvantages of 
implementing this jurisprudential scheme. 
A. The Solution 
Importantly, the McClain doctrine does not enforce foreign laws. The 
defendants in Hollinshead, McClain, and Schultz were convicted of 
violating the NSPA. Where the foreign law at issue clearly and 
unambiguously vests ownership of cultural property in the State, the 
NSPA will recognize a violation of the foreign law as theft, such that the 
disputed object is also considered “stolen” within the meaning of U.S. law. 
As a result, the substantive violation is of U.S. law, even if it is based on a 
foreign law. The McClain doctrine, in short, transforms a violation of 
foreign cultural patrimony law into a violation of the NSPA. 
The structure of this legal framework offers an ideal solution to the 
indigenous cultural patrimony problem. Because tribal criminal 
jurisdiction is narrowly circumscribed, tribes cannot punish non-Indians 
who take cultural property in violation of tribal cultural patrimony laws. 
Through the McClain doctrine, a violation of tribal law could be 
transformed into a violation of the NSPA, effectively expanding the 
jurisdictional reach of tribal cultural patrimony laws. This would allow 
tribes to punish non-Indian traffickers, enhancing the effectiveness of 
tribal law. Further, it would enable indigenous peoples to exercise their 
right to cultural self-determination. This application might be termed the 
“indigenous McClain doctrine,” because it applies both to Native 
American cultural patrimony and because it applies domestically to 
objects found in the United States, unlike other applications of the 
McClain doctrine. 
In addition to offering a workable mechanism for solving the 












doctrine to tribal law is consistent with the principles undergirding the 
court’s original exercise of the doctrine. Although the McClain doctrine 
has been subject to scholarly criticism, the courts that have confronted the 
doctrine have never disapproved of the underlying legal principles.262 For 
its domestic application, the most important principles of the McClain 
doctrine are its acknowledgement of the special interest in cultural 
property and its focus on legal—not cultural—matters. Because no 
jurisprudential bar limits the application of the McClain doctrine to tribal 
law, and such an application actually affirms the principles for which the 
doctrine stands, it can and should be applied to Native American cultural 
patrimony laws. 
B. Full Respect for Cultural Self-Determination 
Applying the “indigenous McClain doctrine” would transform tribal 
cultural patrimony laws into effective protections of Native American 
cultural objects on par with NAGPRA. But, unlike the existing statute, 
these laws would respect tribes’ right to cultural self-determination. 
Unlike NAGPRA cases, in which the inquiry focuses on whether the 
unlawfully obtained object actually has ongoing historical, traditional, or 
cultural importance central to the Native American group, courts applying 
the McClain doctrine do not consider whether the trafficked items 
constitute cultural patrimony. Instead, these courts only analyze the laws 
purporting to vest ownership of the cultural objects in the state. 
In McClain I, the court undertook a comprehensive analysis of the 
Mexican patrimony law.263 As part of its inquiry, the court heard evidence 
from a deputy attorney general of Mexico and evaluated his testimony. 
Although the court’s appraisal of the Mexican government official may 
initially resemble the court’s self-determination-limiting evaluation of 
tribal witnesses in the NAGPRA cases, the court limited its inquiry, 
preventing intrusions on cultural self-determination. The Fifth Circuit 
looked in detail at the language, intent, and history of five different 
statutes to determine if they actually vested ownership of the object in the 
Republic. But the court never sought to determine whether the trafficked 
object actually had cultural importance to Mexico. Importantly, the court 
looked only to the law itself, fully accepting Mexico’s judgment that the 
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object constituted cultural patrimony. In so doing, the McClain court fully 
respected Mexico’s cultural self-determination.  
In Schultz, the Second Circuit once more weighed conflicting evidence 
about cultural patrimony, but limited itself again to a consideration of the 
law at issue, foregoing an analysis of the trafficked object.264 Here, the 
court was clear about its task, stating that the court is “capable of 
evaluating foreign patrimony laws.”265 Conducting this evaluation, the 
court assessed the testimony of several witnesses, not all of whom were 
Egyptian nationals. This review, however, did not violate Egyptian 
cultural self-determination because it was restricted to a discussion of the 
law. 
Notably, when the court outlined its role in adjudicating foreign 
cultural patrimony cases, it did not make a statement about its capacity to 
evaluate an object’s cultural patrimony status. This omission is owed not 
to its inability to make this determination, as NAGPRA jurisprudence 
amply demonstrates. Rather, the omission highlights the irrelevance of 
such an evaluation in McClain doctrine cases. In Schultz, the decision 
about what constituted protected cultural objects was left to Egypt alone. 
Because the McClain doctrine uncritically accepts the judgment of the 
state that enacted the ownership law, this doctrine respects the cultural 
self-determination of the sovereign state. Unlike NAGPRA, the McClain 
doctrine fully respects this right, making the legal scheme a better answer 
to meeting the goals outlined by UNDRIP than the current U.S. statutory 
protection for Native American cultural objects.  
C. Equal Value for Native American and Foreign Cultures 
In addition to more fully respecting tribal cultural self-determination 
than NAGPRA, the indigenous McClain doctrine would also more highly 
value indigenous culture than the current legal protection. The McClain 
doctrine applies to a narrow class of laws protecting a unique kind of 
property. In McClain I, the court clarified that the main question was 
whether the NSPA should be extended to cover “property of a very special 
kind.”266 In the Fifth Circuit’s estimation, the property at issue was special 
because its cultural importance made it government-owned, even before it 
was discovered or physically possessed.  
The court in Schultz similarly acknowledged the significance of the 
property at stake. The effusive language used by the Southern District of 
New York to describe the disputed patrimony testifies to its importance: 
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The marvelous artifacts of ancient Egypt, so wondrous in their 
beauty and in what they teach of the advent of civilization, 
inevitably invite the attention, not just of scholars and aesthetes, but 
of tomb-robbers, smugglers, black-marketeers, and assorted thieves. 
Every pharaoh, it seems, has a price on his head (at least if the head 
is cast in stone); and if the price is right, a head-hunter will be found 
to sever the head from its lawful owner.267 
Rhapsodizing the “highly valuable ancient Egyptian artifacts,”268 the 
opinion bases its acceptance of the McClain doctrine, in part, on the 
inherent value of the cultural objects.  
The McClain and Schultz decisions document the courts’ willingness to 
apply the NSPA to thefts defined by foreign patrimony laws because of 
the significance of the property at stake. If the court eagerly celebrates 
Egyptian and Mexican artifacts, it should afford Native American cultural 
objects the same reverential attitude. Yet, the current legal scheme 
governing cultural patrimony differentiates foreign and domestic objects. 
Under U.S. law, if the punishments imposed for violating cultural 
patrimony laws correspond to the cultural worth of the unlawfully 
trafficked object, Native American items are implicitly treated as less 
valuable than foreign artifacts. A first-time conviction under NAGPRA for 
illegally trafficking in Native American cultural items is a misdemeanor, 
the maximum punishment for which is one year in prison.269 In contrast, a 
first offense under the NSPA for violation of a foreign cultural patrimony 
law can be punished with a prison sentence of up to ten years.270 Limiting 
NAGPRA violations to misdemeanors signals the relative unimportance of 
Native American cultural objects. But Native American objects are also a 
“property of a very special kind.”271 Applying the NSPA to cultural 
property discovered within the United States and trafficked in violation of 
tribal patrimony laws would signify the equal importance of American 
indigenous cultural patrimony by allowing for the same degree of 
punishment.  
D. No Jurisprudential Bar  
Although the McClain doctrine has not yet been applied to tribal law, 
no jurisprudential bar limits its application to cases concerning unlawfully 
trafficked Native American cultural objects obtained in violation of tribal 
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laws. Tribes can devise cultural patrimony laws analogous to the national 
vesting laws in Mexico and Egypt.272 If the law clearly and unambiguously 
vests ownership of the cultural objects in the tribe, then a violation of that 
law should also amount to a violation of the NSPA if the item is trafficked 
in interstate or international commerce. The only potential obstacle stems 
from the McClain doctrine’s requirement that the foreign jurisdiction 
actually enforce its cultural property law.273 Accordingly, tribes must have 
a practice of applying their cultural property laws to known violations for 
the “indigenous McClain doctrine” to function. Initially, this may seem 
impossible, because tribal cultural property laws are criminal and thus do 
not apply to non-Indians. Tribes, however, can apply their criminal laws to 
Native Americans in their tribes as well as to other nonmember Indians.274 
Because it is not uncommon for Native Americans to illegally trade in 
cultural property belonging to both their own tribes and others, it would be 
possible to prosecute these individuals under the tribal cultural property 
law. In so doing, the tribe would then produce a record of enforcement 
against outsiders, thus fulfilling the requirements of the McClain doctrine. 
Tribal law should be afforded the same coverage under the McClain 
doctrine as Egyptian or Mexican law. Considering its proximity and 
occasional application in the United States already, applying tribal law 
through the NSPA will be easier than applying Egyptian law. 
Doctrinally, applying tribal law through the NSPA is not inconsistent 
with current U.S. law. By mandating full faith and credit for tribal court 
judgments, other U.S. policies enforce tribal laws in specific subject areas, 
paralleling the indigenous McClain doctrine’s proposed application of 
tribal law in cultural patrimony cases.275 The Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA), for instance, allows tribes to exercise jurisdiction in child 
custody and adoption decisions, even where they affect non-Indians.276 
Because many children were adopted away from tribes without tribal 
control, and because “there is no resource . . . more vital to the . . . tribes 
than their children,”277 Congress passed ICWA to bolster tribes’ ability to 
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protect their existence and integrity.278 ICWA recognizes broad 
jurisdiction for tribal law in these cases in acknowledgment that the tribe 
occupies the best position to protect and preserve tribal resources.279 
Considering the centrality of cultural objects to a group’s identity,  
ICWA’s recognition of the importance of tribal responsibility over tribal 
resources could easily be expanded to include cultural property resources 
as well. The indigenous McClain doctrine, therefore, is not dissimilar from 
an ICWA-like cultural property regime that would recognize criminal and 
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians.  
The McClain doctrine extends the application of the NSPA to foreign 
ownership laws, in part, because such laws are “an act inherent in the 
notion of sovereignty,” and recognizing these laws “is regarded as an 
aspect of comity among nations.”280 Justifying the application of the 
NSPA, the Court in McClain I held that “[t]he Republic of Mexico, when 
stolen property has moved across the Mexican border, is in a similar 
position to any state of the United States in which a theft occurs and the 
property is moved across state boundaries.”281 The court thus makes clear 
that the NSPA can be applied to violations of state, federal, or foreign 
laws. 
Native American tribes occupy a distinct position in the American legal 
landscape; they are “subordinate and dependent nations,” so less than a 
foreign nation like Egypt or Mexico, but “have a status higher than that of 
states.”282 Given this status and the broad application of the NSPA, tribal 
law should be afforded the same deference as state law or foreign cultural 
patrimony laws.283 The fact that it is a tribe in which ownership is vested 
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should not make a difference. As the court in Schultz announced: the 
identity of the rightful owner of the stolen property is inconsequential.284  
The indigenous McClain doctrine satisfies the seemingly incompatible 
goals of America’s new policy committments toward Native Americans 
affirmed by UNDRIP. The McClain doctrine fully respects the right to 
self-determination by unquestioningly accepting a tribe’s decision about 
what constitutes its cultural patrimony. Moreover, if the tribal cultural 
patrimony law clearly and unambiguously vests ownership in the tribe, the 
indigenous McClain doctrine would recognize objects taken in violation of 
this law as “stolen” within the meaning of the NSPA, effectively giving 
broad jurisdictional reach to the tribal law. Accordingly, the indigenous 
McClain doctrine would satisfy the objective of implementing an effective 
legal protection of Native American cultural objects.  
NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUSION  
Although implementing the indigenous McClain doctrine satisfies 
America’s new dual commitment to safeguard Native American cultural 
objects and respect the right to cultural self-determination, applying the 
framework to tribal patrimony laws raises several questions.  
Perhaps the most immediate concern is that most tribes in the United 
States do not have cultural patrimony laws. Before the McClain doctrine 
can recognize theft of Native American cultural objects as “stolen” under 
the NSPA, tribal laws must first define what constitutes a tribe’s 
patrimony and vest ownership of the objects in the tribe, criminalizing 
unpermitted excavation and removal. In her 2010 study of tribal codes, 
Angela Riley found that only some fourteen percent of the tribes studied 
had laws addressing cultural preservation and protection, including 
cultural patrimony laws.285  
The relative dearth of tribal cultural patrimony laws, however, could be 
advantageous. Today, tribes could tailor their patrimony laws with 
knowledge of which foreign laws met the requirements delineated by the 
McClain court. In addition to identifying which objects constitute their 
cultural patrimony, Native American groups could devise laws that clearly 
and unambiguously establish tribal ownership, ensuring the laws would be 
recognized by U.S. courts. But it is questionable whether requiring tribes 
to tailor tribal cultural patrimony laws to meet U.S. legal standards is a 
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more insidious infringement on self-determination than letting U.S. courts 
decide what constitutes cultural patrimony under NAGPRA.286  
The Fifth Circuit’s requirements raise additional concerns for the 
practicability of the indigenous McClain doctrine. The McClain doctrine 
limits its application to objects found within the border of the nation 
claiming ownership. If foreign patrimony laws are not given 
extraterritorial effect, what territory can tribal laws be said to govern? If 
the territorial limit means that tribal cultural patrimony laws would only be 
applied to objects found on reservations, this framework would provide a 
more limited protection than NAGPRA, which covers cultural objects 
found on reservations and federal lands. However, if the indigenous 
McClain doctrine recognizes the modern border of the United States as the 
applicable territory, then this framework would provide a robust protection 
more extensive than NAGPRA because it would cover private and state 
lands as well. 
NAGPRA does have one clear advantage over the indigenous McClain 
doctrine. While no specific financial or commercial value must be attached 
to the protected object to trigger NAGPRA’s criminal provision,287 to be 
convicted under the NSPA the trafficked items must be worth $5,000 or 
more.288 In this way, NAGPRA actually offers a more expansive legal 
protection than applying the framework proposed.  
Nevertheless, the indigenous McClain doctrine would allow tribes to 
decide what is best for them and how best to protect their cultural objects. 
If tribes so chose, the indigenous McClain doctrine provides an effective 
mechanism for punishing all looters, Native Americans and non-Indians 
alike, for violating tribal laws protecting the cultural objects that Native 
Americans have decided for themselves constitute their cultural 
patrimony.  
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